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The employment relationship is governed largely by contract, but with a 
heavy overlay of “rights”:  minimum terms and individual rights that are es-
tablished by external law and are typically nonwaivable.  But some terms of 
employment are governed neither by ordinary contract nor by ordinary rights, 
nor even by ordinary waivable rights.  Both of the two most controversial con-
tractual instruments in employment law today—non-compete covenants and 
mandatory arbitration agreements—take the form of written contracts; both 
waive important employee rights (the right to compete postemployment, the right 
to litigate future claims); and both are subject to substantive criteria of validity 
that are set by external law.  Both bodies of law may be usefully described as 
recognizing “conditionally waivable” rights. 
This Article aims first to show structural parallels between non-compete 
covenants and mandatory arbitration agreements that place them at a distinct 
intermediate point along the spectrum between nonwaivable rights and ordi-
nary contract.  Second, it seeks to uncover a common logic underlying the law’s 
choice of this particular hybrid of rights and contract.  The linchpin of that 
common logic lies in the threat that an unregulated waiver of one right (the 
right to compete or to litigate future claims) poses to adjacent employee rights 
that the law deems nonwaivable.  Third, this Article deploys that underlying 
logic to offer a critical assessment of the law governing non-competes and arbi-
tration agreements.  Finally, this Article tentatively explores the broader poten-
tial usefulness of conditional waivability as a way of regulating some terms of 
employment.  The intriguing potential of conditional waivability lies in its in-
jection of some of the virtues of contract—especially flexibility and variability in 
the face of widely divergent and changing circumstances—into the pursuit of 
public goals and the realization of rights in the workplace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Employment law straddles the divide between public law and pri-
vate law.  That position reflects the dual nature of the employment re-
lationship.  On the one hand, that relationship is fundamentally con-
tractual; it originates in an individual’s agreement to work for an 
employer, and most of its terms—wage rates, benefits, hours of work, 
job duties, job security, and terminability—are set by the explicit or 
implicit agreement of the parties.  Yet the employment relationship is 
also constrained by employee rights and entitlements that are estab-
lished by external law, that reflect public values and interests, and that 
typically cannot be varied or waived by contract.  For example, em-
ployees cannot agree to work for less than the minimum wage or un-
der conditions that violate safety standards, nor can they agree to ac-
cept racial discrimination.  (I will refer to all such entitlements here as 
“rights.”)  Much of employment law consists of the competing para-
digms of rights and contract.1
Yet two of the most controversial and litigated instruments in con-
temporary employment law do not quite fit either the contract para-
1 I do not claim that employment law is unique in its interlacing of rights and con-
tract.  Landlord-tenant law, for example, has followed much the same historical trajec-
tory over the past two centuries as has employment law:  from status to contract to, in 
many jurisdictions, a heavy overlay of rights on the contract. 
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digm or the rights paradigm.  Both mandatory arbitration agreements 
and non-compete covenants take the form of contracts—specifically, 
contracts that waive important employee rights; yet those contracts are 
not valid unless they meet specific substantive legal criteria drawn 
from external law.2  Mandatory arbitration agreements, which waive 
the right to litigate future legal claims in a judicial forum in favor of 
arbitration (and which I will hereafter call simply “arbitration agree-
ments”3), are subject to conditions that aim to ensure the adequacy 
and fairness of the arbitral regime to which they commit the em-
ployee.  For example, an agreement may be invalid if it requires em-
ployee plaintiffs to pay an excessive fee for the arbitrator’s services, or 
if the process it prescribes is skewed toward the employer.  Non-
compete covenants, which constrain the right to practice one’s occu-
pation in competition with the employer after employment has 
ceased, are scrutinized for the legitimacy of the employer interests 
that they protect and the reasonableness of the restraints they place 
on postemployment competition.  An agreement may be invalid, for 
example, if it lasts too long or reaches too far geographically, or if the 
employer cannot show that the agreement is needed to protect trade 
secrets or the like. 
Beyond the fact that both agreements are increasingly common, 
frequently litigated, and controversial among employment lawyers and 
legal scholars, they may initially appear to have little in common.  
And, to be sure, the law of arbitration agreements and the law of non-
compete covenants address very different normative and policy con-
2 In a recent paper, Katherine Stone draws a different parallel between these two 
kinds of agreements:  both impose obligations on employees that outlast the underly-
ing employment contract, which is usually terminable at will.  See Katherine V.W. 
Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine:  Imposed Terms, Implied Terms, and the 
Normative World of the Workplace 1-3 (UCLA School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper No. 06-38, 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931666.  Stone 
argues that the presence of terms that live beyond the life of the contract render it 
something other than an at-will contract, and thus raise the possibility that courts 
could imply other terms—terms such as fairness and good faith—that also live beyond 
the life of the agreement.  On the other hand, the hybrid status quo might simply at-
test to employers’ ability to secure express contract terms that they prefer, including 
both terminability at will and some post-termination constraints on employees, and to 
the resulting difficulty of protecting employee entitlements through implied terms, 
default rules, or waivable rights that can be reversed by express contract.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 24-27.  As far as I know, Stone and I are the first legal scholars to 
focus on parallels between non-compete covenants and mandatory arbitration agree-
ments. 
3 Not to be confused with uncontroversially valid agreements to arbitrate existing 
disputes. 
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cerns.  But these two kinds of agreements, and the bodies of law that 
govern them, turn out to share some interesting structural features.  
The two bodies of law exemplify an important intermediate or hybrid 
form of employment regulation, one that I will call “conditionally 
waivable rights.”4  In the case of both arbitration agreements and non-
compete covenants, I will argue that conditional waivability provides a 
framework for protecting nonwaivable employee rights that lie imme-
diately adjacent to the rights that can be waived, and that are at risk in 
these agreements, while giving the parties flexibility to achieve legiti-
mate, mutually beneficial ends. 
It is another question how well current law carries out that objec-
tive.  That question, in turn, is complicated by the fact that both the 
law of non-compete covenants and the law of mandatory arbitration 
agreements come in stricter and more lenient versions.  I find in both 
cases that the stricter versions of the law do a better job of protecting 
what needs protecting and accommodating what can be accommo-
dated.  In both cases, the law could be improved by a more systematic 
understanding of what is at stake, and how the solution of conditional 
waivability can and should work.  In this Article, I seek to advance that 
end. 
I begin in Part I by showing that non-compete covenants and 
mandatory arbitration agreements have more in common than meets 
the eye.  The two bodies of law that govern them occupy a distinct in-
termediate point along the spectrum that runs from nonwaivable em-
ployee rights to ordinary contract.  This distinctive hybrid of rights 
and contract gives rise to some characteristic problems and intriguing 
parallels between the two bodies of law.  I proceed in Part II to inves-
tigate the logic of conditional waivability:  why might the law in both 
areas have settled on conditional waivability as opposed to either or-
dinary contract or nonwaivability?  I dig beneath the doctrine to iden-
tify parallel constellations of rights and interests, legitimate and ille-
gitimate, that are at stake in the law of arbitration and non-compete 
agreements, and that might make sense of the law’s choice of condi-
4 Cass Sunstein identifies and briefly explores this same intermediate space:  em-
ployee rights that are subject to what he calls “constrained waiver.”  Cass R. Sunstein, 
Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 243-45 (2001).  There is no 
substantial difference between his category and mine, though my term tends to direct 
attention to the particular conditions the law sets for waiver.  Moreover, Sunstein does 
not identify either arbitration agreements or non-compete agreements as examples of 
“constrained waivers,” and thus perhaps underestimates the extent to which existing 
law populates this particular intermediate category. 
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tional waivability.  In Part III, I deploy this analysis to cast a critical 
light upon existing law in both areas:  given what is at stake in both 
arbitration and non-compete agreements, how well does the law do at 
setting and enforcing appropriate conditions for waiver?  Finally, in 
Part IV, I venture some preliminary thoughts about the broader use of 
conditionally waivable rights within employment law. 
Conditional waivability holds out the promise of introducing some 
of the virtues of contract—especially flexibility and variability in the 
face of widely divergent and changing circumstances—into the pursuit 
of public goals and the realization of rights in the workplace.  It allows 
employees and employers to bargain within publicly constrained 
channels toward publicly sanctioned ends in light of particular cir-
cumstances and preferences.  As the law of arbitration agreements 
and non-competes makes clear, conditional waivability is no panacea; 
indeed, it may have a built-in tendency to generate complexity, inde-
terminacy, and, as a result, litigation.  Still, for some employment-
related entitlements, this hybrid form of regulation might be a sensi-
ble way out of the familiar face-off between employment mandates 
and market ordering.  As such, it might also point the way to real in-
novations in employment law and in workplace governance. 
I.  SITUATING CONDITIONALLY WAIVABLE RIGHTS  
BETWEEN RIGHTS AND CONTRACT 
Two of the hottest topics in employment law—both as subjects of 
academic inquiry and as areas of practice—are mandatory arbitration 
agreements and covenants not to compete.  These two seemingly un-
related bodies of law have more in common than has been previously 
recognized.  Both straddle the basic divide between contract and em-
ployee rights, for they take the form of contract yet are subject to dis-
tinctive legal constraints that protect employee rights.  These two 
kinds of agreements and the law that governs them represent a dis-
tinctive hybrid of rights and contract that I call “conditionally waivable 
rights,” and which seems to underlie some parallel doctrinal problems 
in the two areas. 
 
A.  Rights Versus Contract 
The poles of the spectrum are familiar:  on one end, the contrac-
tual paradigm of the employment relationship, and on the other, the 
domain of employee rights.  Contract is the default mode of regulat-
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ing employment relationships:  unless the law has taken some issue off 
the bargaining table, it is governed by the agreement of the parties.  
The terms of the employment contract may be express, whether writ-
ten or oral, or they may be implied.  They may be explicitly bargained 
for between the parties or not.  The contract may be terminable at will 
or not.  None of these variations negates the fundamentally contrac-
tual nature of the employment relationship. 
To be sure, as one commentator has observed, “the law of em-
ployment contracts is highly idiosyncratic.”5  The law of the employ-
ment contract has come under pressure in part because of the per-
ceived disparity in bargaining power between employers and 
employees.6  Most employment contracts arise between individuals 
who are more or less dependent on a single job and comparatively 
large organizations that are repeat players with diversified investments 
in the labor market.7  Most contract terms are offered by employers 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and are set under the shadow of employ-
ment at will—the employer’s presumptive power to fire employees for 
any reason at all, including refusal to accept the employer’s proferred 
or modified terms of employment.8  Skepticism about the bargaining 
5 Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, 
10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2003).  For example, “[c]ourts frequently find binding 
obligations in cases where contract formalities are absent, while avoiding enforcement 
of signed documents carrying all of the trappings of enforceable instruments.”  Id.
6 That perception, a bête-noir of many economics-oriented scholars, see infra note 
18, is enshrined in the preamble to the National Labor Relations Act:  “The inequality 
of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association 
or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or 
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com-
merce . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).  Of course, saying it does not make it so, even 
when the speaker is Congress.  But, at a minimum, it does help to explain existing law, 
much of which I take here as given. 
7 Or, in Samuel Issacharoff’s more colorful metaphor, “the hiring stage is most 
like a first date between a polygamist and a monogamist.”  Samuel Issacharoff, Contract-
ing for Employment:  The Limited Return of the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1795 
(1996). 
8 The default presumption of employment at will has proven tenacious.  Until the 
1960s, the at-will presumption was fortified by requirements of “additional considera-
tion” and “mutuality of obligation” that made it peculiarly hard to dislodge by contrary 
agreement.  See, e.g., Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 139 So. 760, 761 (La. 
1932) (holding that an employment contract that is to continue for as long as the em-
ployer is in business lacks “‘mutuality’”); Savage v. Spur Distrib. Co., 228 S.W.2d 122, 
124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949) (finding employment at will, and noting that “unless both 
parties are bound neither is bound”).  Those fortifications have largely crumbled, and 
agreements for job security are now generally enforceable.  On the other hand, the law 
has largely accommodated employers’ desire to retain employment at will by giving 
effect to “disclaimers” that have become standard features of employee handbooks.  
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power of employees has contributed to courts’ willingness to intervene 
in the employment contract to redress abuses that offend public pol-
icy—for example, a discharge for refusing to violate the law or for ex-
ercising an employment-related right (e.g., filing a workers’ compen-
sation claim).9  Still, most terms of the employment relationship are 
governed not by external law or public policy but by the express or 
implied agreement of the parties. 
Of course, underlying the freedom of contract, in employment as 
elsewhere, is the law establishing the baseline entitlements of the par-
ties.10  Employers, for their part, own whatever they own under the 
governing law of property—typically the workplace itself and the tools 
and other physical means of production, as well as their trade secrets 
and other intellectual property.  Employees own themselves and the 
skills, talents, experience, and most of the knowledge that contribute 
to their productivity.11  The allocation of entitlements to the informa-
tion that resides in employees’ heads has grown in importance as in-
formation has become a larger factor of production and a component 
of commercial value.12  Distinguishing between employers’ intellectual 
property, especially their trade secrets, and the general skills and 
knowledge that belong to employees themselves as an aspect of self-
ownership is a tricky but necessary exercise—and one to which we will 
See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1103-04 (Cal. 2000) (holding that a 
handbook’s disclaimer of term employment, while not dispositive, is evidence that the 
contract did not limit termination rights); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 
N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 1995) (holding that a disclaimer in an employee handbook 
prevented the enumerated progressive discipline policies from constituting a con-
tract). 
9 These are examples of “rights” being superimposed on or carved out of the em-
ployment contract; more on that development shortly. 
10 To underscore that “the law cannot ‘do nothing,’” but rather must set the initial 
entitlements of contracting parties, Sunstein characterizes those entitlements that are 
left to contract as “waivable employers’ rights.”  Sunstein, supra note 4, at 208-09.  For 
present purposes I endorse the insight but not the terminology.  It seems jarring to 
characterize a nonmandatory employee benefit—say, paid vacation time—as the 
waiver of an employer’s right (namely, not to give paid vacations). 
11 The indispensability of self-ownership to freedom of contract was recognized by 
both Adam Smith and John Locke.  The question of whether self-ownership was suffi-
cient for genuine freedom of contract has generated controversy throughout the his-
tory of the American republic.  For illuminating treatments of this history, see AMY 
DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT:  WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MAR-
KET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9-10 (1998); William E. Forbath, The Ambigui-
ties of Free Labor:  Labor and Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 776-78. 
12 On the varieties of human capital and their legal treatment, see Paul H. Rubin 
& Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not To Compete, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 95-
100 (1981). 
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return in connection with non-compete covenants—because it estab-
lishes the baseline against which contracting takes place.  Most basi-
cally, however, employees’ self-ownership means that they are free to 
accept or decline employment if it is offered, or to quit employment 
after it has begun.  Since the inviolability of self-ownership was finally 
established in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century with 
the abolition of slavery and the adoption of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, it is axiomatic that one cannot sell oneself, even voluntarily, 
into servitude.  The individual’s self-ownership, and the right to quit 
employment, are inalienable.13
So the legal foundation of the employment relationship is the law 
of property (including the inalienable right of self-ownership) and of 
contract.  Yet, as compared to many other contractual relationships, 
the employment relationship is highly regulated.  Beyond the basic 
entitlement of self-ownership and certain rights of privacy and bodily 
integrity that partake of that entitlement, a many-layered edifice of 
rights and minimum standards, grounded in federal and state consti-
tutions, statutes, and common law doctrines, sets bounds on the free-
dom of contract in employment.  In addition, employees have rights 
against discrimination (based on, for example, race, sex, age, preg-
nancy, and disability),14 and rights to engage in certain activities free 
from employer reprisals (for example, supporting a union, complain-
ing of discrimination, or in some cases revealing harmful and illegal 
conduct or refusing to violate the law).  Employees also enjoy the pro-
tection of laws that establish minimum terms and conditions of em-
ployment, such as wages and hours, occupational health and safety, 
and family leave. 
I denominate here as “rights” all employee entitlements, includ-
ing self-ownership, that arise from external law independent of the 
13 With this caveat:  employees who agree to a fixed (and reasonably short) term 
of employment, and who quit early, may be liable for damages and may be enjoined 
from working for another employer, though not from quitting.  The unavailability of 
specific performance to enforce a “personal services” contract is well established, but 
not without its critics.  See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of 
Employees, 46 STAN. L. REV. 87, 90-93 (1993) (arguing that the unavailability of specific 
performance denies employees valuable bargaining leverage).  The precise contours of 
the “right to quit” remain a bit hazy, and are a fit subject for further investigation. 
14 For an overview of the antiretaliation and antidiscrimination branches of 
wrongful discharge law, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-
Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1669-86 (1996).  Of course, many of these doctrines 
operate not only as constraints on discharge, but also as constraints on the employer’s 
treatment of the employee during the employment relationship. 
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agreement between the parties, and that are legally protected against 
invasion by the employer.  As I will discuss shortly, most of these em-
ployee rights not only arise from outside the contract, but are also 
nonwaivable, and thus are shielded from the give-and-take of contract.  
The employment relationship has long been highly contested social 
terrain, and the public historically has staked claims to a sizable share 
of that terrain.  The vast and varied domain of employee rights has 
made the employment relationship as much a creature of public law 
as of private law. 
Much employment law scholarship concerns the wisdom of ex-
panding or contracting the bite that rights take out of freedom of 
contract.  Law-and-economics scholars in particular, while not uni-
formly opposing employee rights, have succeeded in putting some re-
curring questions on the table:  Why not leave it to the parties to bar-
gain over these matters?  Will not those bargains better reflect the 
actual preferences of the parties?  And will it do employees any good 
to impose mandates, given employers’ inexorable freedom to employ 
or not to employ and, within wide bounds, to set wages?15  These de-
bates have been played out extensively, even exhaustively, in connec-
tion with the venerable employment-at-will presumption and the rele-
gation of job security to the realm of contract. 
While commentators continue to debate whether it makes sense 
to establish fixed entitlements for employees within essentially volun-
tary contractual relationships, American lawmakers have done so re-
peatedly, especially over the last half century.  Proponents of em-
ployee rights, existing and proposed, sound recurring themes:  Some 
harken to fundamental commitments to public morality and requisites 
of personhood in a liberal democratic society (for example, rights of 
self-ownership and bodily integrity, freedom of association, and free-
dom from discrimination).16  Some accept the basic contractual para-
digm but contend for exceptions based on third-party effects or other 
bargaining impediments.17  Others emphasize—to the consternation 
15 Illustrative analyses include RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
358-59 (4th ed. 1998); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 947, 982 (1984); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination 
Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1131-37 (1989). 
16 On the importance of expanding legal protections for employees, see Clyde W. 
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:  Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 
481 (1976). 
17 See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party 
Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1943 (1996) (arguing that many “public policy” cases can 
be understood as avoiding negative public externalities).  For discussions of the ineffi-
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of law-and-economics scholars—longstanding and pervasive doubts 
about employees’ ability to bargain for themselves in support of 
higher minimum standards and more, and broader, employee 
rights.18
The choice between rights and contract is thus basic and hotly 
contested.  But it is not a simple binary choice.  Some employee rights 
are waivable (though most are not).19  For example, a public em-
ployee may waive part of her First Amendment right to speak on mat-
ters of public concern by agreeing to keep certain matters confiden-
tial or by taking a job that entails speaking for the agency that employs 
her.20  An employee may waive privacy rights by agreeing to searches 
that would otherwise violate those rights; she may do so at the time of 
the search or ahead of time by accepting an employer policy of con-
ducting searches.21  Either way, this is an instance of rights giving way 
ciencies caused by racial discrimination, see John J. Donahue III, Advocacy Versus Analy-
sis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1609-10 (1992) 
(reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRINATION LAWS (1992)); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial 
Discrimination in Employment:  The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1624-
31 (1991); J. Hoult Verkerke, Free to Search, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2082 (1992) (re-
viewing EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra). 
18 Law-and-economics scholars have repeatedly criticized the “unequal bargaining 
power” claim and argued for greater deference to contracts.  See, e.g., Stewart J. 
Schwab, The Law and Economics Approach to Workplace Regulation, in GOVERNMENT REGU-
LATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 91, 111-13 (Bruce E. Kaufman ed., 1997); 
Michael L. Wachter & Randall D. Wright, The Economics of Internal Labor Markets, 29 IN-
DUS. REL. 240, 260 (1990).  For a thoughtful defense of the “unequal bargaining 
power” thesis, see Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest Labor Law:  Law and Economics in 
the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767, 2787 (1991) (reviewing PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING 
THE WORKPLACE:  THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990)). 
19 That is, most employee rights—such as the right to be paid a minimum wage or 
to be free from discrimination—cannot be waived ex ante.  See, e.g., Barrentine v. Ar-
kansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1981) (recognizing that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act’s protections against substandard wages and oppressive condi-
tions “cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived”); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an em-
ployee’s rights under Title VII.”).  Of course, claims over the past violation of rights can 
be waived or settled. 
20 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510 (1980) (per curiam) (upholding 
an agreement requiring a former CIA agent to submit book material concerning the 
CIA for prepublication review).  Apart from particular instances of public employees 
waiving speech rights, the Supreme Court’s most cogent explanation of the con-
strained free speech rights of a public employee as against her government employer 
rests essentially on a notion of waiver—of accepting certain speech restrictions as a 
condition of employment.  See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994). 
21 See, e.g., Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex. App. 
1989) (upholding an employer’s random drug-testing program). 
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to contract or consent.22  Making employee rights waivable converts 
them into bargaining chips that, at least in principle, allow employees 
to make mutually beneficial bargains with their employers.23
There are other shades of gray at the contractual end of the spec-
trum.  Even for those matters that are left entirely to contract, the law 
might set a default rule that embodies some notion of employees’ pre-
sumptive entitlements, placing the burden on the employer to con-
tract expressly for more favorable terms.24  The issue is most vividly 
posed in the context of employment at will, where some scholars have 
argued for switching the default to something like just cause, partly in 
recognition of employees’ beliefs about their entitlement to job secu-
rity and about what is fair and lawful.25  This might be seen as an effort 
to embed a weak employee right or entitlement into the employment 
contract. 
Indeed, there is not much difference between an employee-
friendly default rule and a waivable employee right:  both allocate an 
entitlement to the employee absent an express understanding to the 
22 And either way, there is a question whether “consent” is meaningful where it is a 
condition of continued employment and is given under threat of termination.  For an 
argument that it is not, see Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract:  The Law of the 
Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 511-25 (2001).  
For an explanation of the issues posed by “consent” in many privacy disputes, see 
Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights, Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 671, 717-20 (1996).  These issues arise as well in many cases of arbitration agree-
ments and non-compete covenants, as discussed infra Parts III.A-B. 
23 That is the linchpin of Professor Sunstein’s argument for converting many em-
ployee rights that are currently nonwaivable into waivable rights.  Sunstein, supra note 
4, at 207.  He recognizes that waivable employee rights—or default rules, as they would 
then be—may have to be made “sticky” lest they fetch too low a price, and that the law 
might constrain the waiver of rights with either procedural or substantive contraints.  
Id. at 271-72. 
24 A “majority default” seeks to mimic the expected results of actual bargaining 
and thus to minimize transaction costs.  Allocative efficiency can sometimes be pro-
moted by a “penalty default” or an “information-forcing default” that operates against 
the party in the best position to initiate informed bargaining.  Ian Ayres & Robert 
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:  An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE 
L.J. 87, 95-100 (1989).  But a nonmajority default rule might instead reflect social 
norms about the better rule.  Id. at 95. 
25 See Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 1791-97; Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default 
Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106, 119-23 (2002).  Indeed, in one sense that is what the law 
has done:  by dismantling many formalistic hurdles to showing a binding promise of 
job security, and by recognizing some oral and implied promises of job security, the 
law in many jurisdictions induces employers to act as though the default rule were “for 
cause” discharge, and to assert the power to terminate employees at will through ex-
press disclaimers.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, 
And Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 7-8 (2002). 
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contrary.  We tend to use the language of waiver and of rights when 
public law has claimed a stake in the terms of the parties’ relationship, 
and does not relegate those terms to the ordinary rules of contract in-
terpretation.  Public law can thus make rights more or less waivable; 
the law might, for example, entrench an employee right by requiring 
that a waiver be “knowing and voluntary.”  But those who are skeptical 
of employees’ ability to protect their interests through contract find 
little comfort for employees—other than a modest gain in transpar-
ency—in rights that can be waived and default rules that fill contrac-
tual gaps, for employers often have little difficulty exacting waivers 
and filling gaps when it behooves them to do so.26  Still, the existence 
of waivable rights and penalty default rules makes the choice between 
a rights approach and a contract approach look less like a binary one 
and more like a spectrum of possibilities.27
Yet there remains some underexplored territory along that spec-
trum between contract and rights.  Both arbitration agreements and 
non-compete covenants take the form of contracts—contracts that 
waive employee rights.  Mandatory arbitration agreements waive the 
employee’s right to litigate future legal claims in court.  Non-compete 
covenants waive part of the employee’s right to compete with the em-
ployer after employment has ceased.  But these are not ordinary con-
tracts, and the employee rights at stake are not ordinary rights—they 
are neither nonwaivable, like most employee rights, nor waivable in 
the ordinary sense.  They are conditionally waivable rights. 
 
Employee Rights                                                                                Contract 
  
 
Nonwaivable 
Employee 
Rights 
Conditionally 
Waivable  
Employee Rights 
Waivable  
Employee 
Rights 
  Default  
  Favors  
  Employee 
  Default  
  Favors 
  Employer 
26 Catherine L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the Ownership of 
Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765, 768-71 (2002). 
27 Another configuration of contract and regulation is exemplified by the law of 
pensions.  Employers generally have no obligation to offer pension (or health) bene-
fits at all; employees thus have no right to a pension except as a matter of contract.  
But if employers do agree to provide pensions, the pension plans are highly regulated, 
mainly by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001–1461 (2000).  Pension plans thus combine elements of contract and of regula-
tion, but in a way that is distinct from the hybrid of conditionally waivable rights.   
ERISA cannot be understood as a set of legal conditions on waiver, as there are no un-
derlying rights being waived. 
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B.  A Primer on Non-Compete and Arbitration Agreements 
Both non-compete covenants and arbitration agreements waive 
employee rights established by external law.  Both must be express 
and written.28  That alone sets them apart from most terms of the em-
ployment relationship, which, like ordinary contractual terms, can be 
established by oral or implied agreement.  Moreover, it is not enough 
that the employee knowingly and voluntarily enter into these agree-
ments; to be valid, they must meet substantive criteria drawn from ex-
ternal law.  That is what places them in the hybrid category of “condi-
tional waivability.”  A brief introduction to the law of mandatory 
arbitration agreements and of non-compete covenants will elaborate 
the point and help set the stage for the rest of my argument. 
Non-Compete Covenants:  By entering into a non-compete covenant, 
an employee agrees, usually early in the employment, not to enter 
into certain forms of competition with the employer for some period 
of time after employment has ceased.  States vary in their treatment of 
non-compete agreements, though all recognize that, as contracts in 
restraint of competition, they are subject to limitations in the interest 
of the public and the restricted individual.29  Covenants that restrain 
former employees from competing are subject to an extra measure of 
scrutiny (as compared to non-compete covenants in connection with 
the sale of a business, for example) in light of the employee’s disad-
vantageous bargaining position at the time of contracting and hard-
ship at the time of enforcement.30  In the more colorful words of a 
28 A few states recognize oral non-compete agreements; the large majority do not.  
A few states also recognize a form of implied non-compete agreement by way of the 
doctrine of “inevitable disclosure” of trade secrets in very unusual circumstances.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 38-40.  Commentators have been highly skeptical of 
these implied non-compete agreements.  See, e.g., Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargain-
ing for Loyalty in the Information Age:  A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in 
Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2001). 
29 These contracts run afoul of the well-established public policy against contracts 
in restraint of trade, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1) (1981), but 
they fall into a safe harbor for “reasonable” restraints on competition that are “ancil-
lary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship.”  Id. § 188. 
30 See id. § 188 cmt. g (“Postemployment restraints are scrutinized with particular 
care because they are often the product of unequal bargaining power and because the 
employee is likely to give scant attention to the hardship he may later suffer through 
loss of his livelihood.”).  The Restatement also suggests that the employer’s interest in 
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turn-of-the-century Georgia court, such covenants “tend to injure the 
parties making them; diminish their means of procuring livelihoods 
and a competency for their families; tempt improvident persons . . . 
and expose them to imposition and oppression.”31
Some observers assume that it is chiefly high-level executives who 
are asked to sign covenants not to compete; that assumption is bound 
to color one’s view of the need for legal oversight of these agreements.  
But as firms’ profits have come increasingly to depend on information 
that is carried around in the heads of employees, non-compete cove-
nants have filtered down to lower-level employees with relatively little 
sophistication, bargaining power, or economic wherewithal.32  At the 
same time, employees are increasingly unlikely to enjoy any explicit or 
even implicit promise of job security, or to spend their career within a 
single firm.33  The growth of the information-based economy has con-
verged with increasing job mobility to generate an upsurge in cove-
nants not to compete, as well as in scholarly attention to those cove-
nants.34
California stands at the most restrictive end of the spectrum.  By 
statute, “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging 
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
restraining competition from former employees is “less clear” and often more difficult 
to separate from “normal skills of the trade” than in the case of the purchasers of a 
business.  Id. § 188 cmt. b.  An early (pre-Restatement) study of non-compete covenants 
found that postemployment restraints were almost never enforced, while restraints in 
connection with sale of a business were regularly enforced.  Herman Oliphant, A Re-
turn to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 159 (1928), cited in Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Re-
alism:  Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 281-82 (1997). 
31 Rakestraw v. Lanier, 30 S.E. 735, 738 (Ga. 1898). 
32 For evidence of employers’ increasing use of non-compete covenants, see 
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:  EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR 
THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 128 n.3 (2004).  I recently heard of two law students who 
were required to sign non-compete agreements in pre-law-school jobs (not as high-
level executives!).  They did so either reluctantly or with little thought because they 
wanted the jobs, and then later felt compelled to reject attractive job opportunities 
that they feared might violate the terms of the non-compete agreement. 
33 See id. at 93. 
34 Recent scholarly treatments include ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY:  
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 33 (2003); 
STONE, supra note 32, at 127-56; Arnow-Richman, supra note 28; Catherine L. Fisk, 
Working Knowledge:  Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corpo-
rate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001); Ronald J. Gilson, The 
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:  Silicon Valley, Route 128, and 
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 602-09 (1999); Gillian Lester, Restrictive 
Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 
59-71 (2001). 
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void.”35  While the California courts have recognized in principle an 
exception for covenants that are necessary to protect trade secrets, 
they seem never to have actually met such a covenant.36
Other states are more tolerant of these covenants, though none 
treat them like ordinary contracts.37  A non-compete covenant may 
meet all the usual requirements of a contract and yet be invalid if it 
places excessive constraints on postemployment competition.  The Re-
statement provides that the covenant is void as an unreasonable re-
straint of trade if “the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the 
promissee’s legitimate interest,” or if “the promissee’s need is out-
weighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the 
public.”38  So in order to enforce a covenant, even one to which the 
employee knowingly and voluntarily agreed, the employer must show 
(1) that it has a legitimate protectible interest at stake; (2) that the 
particular restrictions are closely tailored to the protection of those 
legitimate interests; and (3) that the restrictions are not too burden-
some to the public or the employee. 
The protection of trade secrets is the quintessential legitimate 
employer interest, but most jurisdictions recognize other employer in-
terests, such as long-term customer relationships and goodwill, that 
would give a former employee an “unfair advantage” in competition 
and thus can support a non-compete covenant.  A simple desire to 
avoid competition from the former employee or to retain the em-
ployee’s services, however rational, is not a legitimate or protectible 
35 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1997).  Nearly as restrictive are the laws 
of Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113 (1986) (voiding covenants not to compete 
save four exceptions), and North Dakota, see N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006) (limit-
ing the use of covenants not to compete to the sale of goodwill or partnership inter-
ests). 
36 See Gilson, supra note 34, at 607-08. 
37 Some judges advocate a more ordinary contractual treatment of these cove-
nants.  See, e.g., Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 669–72 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Posner, J., dissenting) (recommending a more deferential posture toward non-
compete covenants as a matter of policy, though opining that existing Illinois law did 
not support enforcement of the covenant at issue); Robert’s Hair Designers, Inc. v. 
Pearson, 780 N.E.2d 858, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (enforcing a non-compete covenant 
in view of “[a] very strong presumption of enforceability of contracts that represent the 
freely bargained agreement of the parties” (quoting Eck & Assocs., Inc. v. Alusuisse 
Flexible Packaging, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998))). 
38 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(a)-(b) (1981).  Georgia law 
provides a typical statutory formulation:  such a covenant is valid if it is “reasonable, 
founded on valuable consideration, reasonably necessary to protect the [employer’s] 
interest . . . and . . . does not unduly prejudice the interest of the public.”  Riddle v. 
Geo-Hydro Engineers, Inc., 561 S.E.2d 456, 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
  
394 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 379 
 
interest.39  Nor is the value of experience or specialized training af-
forded to the employee; that enhancement of the employee’s general 
skills is deemed to belong to the employee as an inalienable aspect of 
self-ownership.40
Even if the employer can make the threshold showing of a pro-
tectible interest, the agreed-upon restraints on postemployment com-
petition must be reasonable—that is, no broader than necessary in 
duration, in geographic reach, and in the activities covered to protect 
the employer’s legitimate interest.41  So, for example, if the em-
ployer’s legitimate interest is in the protection of long-term relation-
ships with orthodontic patients, the restraint on competition may not 
reach beyond the geographic limits of the employer’s patient base; it 
may not last longer than necessary for the employer to introduce pa-
tients to a replacement orthodontist (no more than several months if 
that is the normal interval between orthodontic visits); and it must be 
limited to orthodontry and may not extend to general dentistry.42  It 
matters not if the employee had agreed to longer or broader limits on 
postemployment competition; those limits will be struck (or perhaps 
revised) if they are longer or broader than necessary. 
Finally, even agreements that are necessary to protect the em-
ployer’s legitimate interests may be void if they impose too great a 
hardship on the public (for example, by promoting a monopoly or in-
terfering with confidential patient and client relationships)43 or on 
the promisor/employee.44  In particular, “the harm caused to the em-
ployee may be excessive if the restraint inhibits his personal freedom 
by preventing him from earning his livelihood if he quits.”45
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. b (1981); see also Hasty v. 
Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984) (noting that an employer must 
show “special facts present over and above ordinary competition” that would otherwise 
give the former employee “an unfair advantage”). 
40 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 652 
(1960). 
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. d. 
42 Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (N.Y. 1971). 
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c.  The rules of professional 
responsibility for attorneys generally prohibit the imposition of non-compete agree-
ments.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (1983). 
44 See Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1283-85 (Ariz. 1999) (hold-
ing that the employer’s interest in protecting its patient base was outweighed by other 
factors, including the personal relationship between doctor and patient). 
45 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 cmt. c. 
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The doctrine follows these same basic lines across the country 
(outside of California).  Some jurisdictions (Texas, for example, at 
least until recently) apply the doctrine with a strong background pre-
sumption against validity—a predisposition against these restraints on 
freedom of labor and competition.46  That translates into something 
akin to “strict scrutiny,” with demands for more “compelling” em-
ployer interests and a tighter fit between those interests and the cove-
nant’s restrictions.  That approach can lead, as it does in its constitu-
tional version, to the consideration of “less restrictive alternatives,” 
such as nonsolicitation and nondisclosure restraints that do not tread 
on the employee’s ability to work.  Other jurisdictions apply the same 
basic doctrinal limitations with less rigor and regularly enforce non-
compete agreements under something like a “rule of reason.”  For ex-
ample, Massachusetts law, which appears to be fairly representative,47 
entertains a relatively broad range of legitimate employer interests—
trade secrets, confidential information, and goodwill—and regularly 
enforces covenants as reasonably “necessary” to protect those inter-
ests.48  Across the country, however, postemployment covenants not to 
compete are subject not merely to the ordinary requirements of con-
tract law but to additional substantive conditions that external law im-
poses on these agreements in particular.49
46 The Texas courts’ traditional hostility to non-compete covenants provoked a 
series of legislative interventions aimed at securing the enforceability of such cove-
nants.  The courts responded with restrictive interpretations of the law that preserved 
their discretion to deny enforcement.  For a review of the saga through 2000, see 
Ernest C. Garcia & Fred A. Helms, Covenants Not To Compete and Not To Disclose, 64 TEX. 
B.J. 32, 33-35 (2001).  Recently the Texas Supreme Court enforced a non-compete 
covenant under standards that clearly make it easier to do so.  Under prior law, a 
covenant was unenforceable if consideration took the form of unenforceable promises 
by the employer; under Sheshunoff, such a covenant becomes enforceable once the 
employer makes good on those promises.  Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs. v. Johnson, 
No. 03-1050, 2006 WL 2997287, at *1 (Tex. Sup. Ct. Oct. 20, 2006).  The upshot, ac-
cording to a Texas lawyer who represents employees, is that “‘Texas has gone from be-
ing employee-friendly to employer-friendly on noncompetes.’”  Mary Alice Robbins, 
High Court Makes Noncompete Covenants Easier To Enforce, TEX. LAW., Oct. 30, 2006, at 7, 
7. 
47 See Gilson, supra note 34, at 603. 
48 See id. at 603–06. 
49 In the words of Professor Stone, “[c]ovenants not to compete occupy a peculiar 
legal ‘Never-Never Land’ between contract and tort, in which party consent and exter-
nally imposed obligation are intimately and complexly intertwined.”  Katherine V.W. 
Stone, Knowledge at Work:  Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 739-40 (2002). 
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One might object that none of this places non-compete agree-
ments outside the domain of ordinary contract, and that the legal 
standards governing these agreements are merely specific elabora-
tions of the limitations that public policy—in this case the public pol-
icy against restraints on competition—places upon contracts gener-
ally.  This objection may take two forms.  First, some readers may deny 
that the law of non-competes has much to do with the protection of 
employee rights, as opposed to the public interest in competition that 
is expressed in the general public policy against agreements in re-
straint of trade.50  To that objection, I would point to the many cases 
that explain the rigorous scrutiny of postemployment non-competes 
in terms of the former employee’s freedom to work in her trade or 
occupation, as well as her freedom during the employment relation-
ship to quit.51
Another form of the objection is more conceptual:  even if the 
limitations on non-competes do protect employee rights, they can be 
adequately understood without leaving the domain of contract 
through the lens of public policy limitations on contract.  But public 
policy is only part of the domain of contract in the sense that it is a 
particularly familiar and well-established constraint on contract.  To be 
sure, the entire domain of freedom of contract is bounded by compet-
ing principles, including the nonwaivable rights of contracting parties.  
The question is not whether the law’s conditions on non-compete 
covenants are really just a reflection of public policy; it is whether it is 
illuminating to think of them as conditions on the waiver of employee 
rights.  When the public policy constraints on a particular type of con-
tract crystallize into discrete substantive criteria for validity, then the 
form itself raises distinct issues (as we shall see shortly) and is worth 
examining, as I aim to do here. 
In my view, treating the legal constraints on non-competes as or-
dinary public policy constraints on contract obscures more than it il-
luminates, for it is equally possible to crowd the entire edifice of em-
ployee rights under the rubric of public policy constraints on contract.  
If we can agree that there is a basic difference in the employment rela-
50 The Restatement does treat the law on ancillary restraints on competition, includ-
ing postemployment restraints, within the chapter on unenforceability on grounds of 
public policy.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 187–188 (1981). 
51 See, e.g., C.G. Caster Co. v. Regan, 357 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976); So-
lari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 56-57 (N.J. 1970); Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. 
Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1976); Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 
P.2d 531, 539 (Wyo. 1993). 
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tionship between terms that are left to contract and those that are es-
tablished by external law in the form of legal rights, then we can also 
agree that the terms that are covered by non-compete covenants par-
take of both.  Whether those terms are well described by the term 
“conditional waivability,” as opposed to, for example, “partial waivabil-
ity,” is a question to which I will return below. 
Arbitration Agreements:  Mandatory arbitration agreements also rep-
resent the hybrid form of “conditional waiver.”  These agreements 
waive the right to litigate employment claims in court, including 
claims under state and federal statutes.  The terms of that waiver are 
subject to scrutiny under substantive criteria drawn from external law.  
The external law in this case stems from a variety of sources. 
The Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.52 
and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams53 that the Federal Arbitration Act 
of 1923 (FAA) makes enforceable agreements to arbitrate rather than 
to litigate employment claims, including state and federal statutory 
discrimination claims.  The FAA provides that agreements to substi-
tute arbitration for litigation “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revo-
cation of any contract.”54  It thus preempts state laws and doctrines 
that single out arbitration agreements for disfavored treatment, while 
preserving general constraints on contract (the unconscionability doc-
trine or the need for consideration, for example).  But the FAA itself 
imposes some requirements of a fair arbitral process and award.55  The 
Supreme Court has also held that an agreement to arbitrate statutory 
claims, to be valid, must enable plaintiffs “effectively [to] vindicate” 
their substantive statutory rights.56  In particular, it must preserve all 
rights and remedies to which substantive law entitles the plaintiff (e.g., 
attorneys fees under Title VII); only the judicial forum, not the under-
lying claim, is waivable.57
The Supreme Court added the “effectively vindicate” standard to 
the mix, not coincidentally, when the FAA and the enforceability of 
mandatory arbitration agreements were first clearly extended to statu-
52 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
53 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001). 
54 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
55 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000) (setting out grounds for vacation of arbitral awards). 
56 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (citing Mitsu-
bishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). 
57 Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628). 
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tory claims.58  When an arbitration agreement covers only contractual 
claims—and that was the main domain of arbitration when the FAA 
was enacted—it raises no special concerns to allow the parties to con-
tract for highly abbreviated dispute resolution procedures as part of 
the overall transaction; the rudimentary standards of the FAA may be 
sufficient.  But when arbitration agreements encompass statutory 
rights, the freedom to contract over dispute resolution procedures 
must be constrained to ensure that the public interest and the statu-
tory rights are protected.  When the rights at issue are themselves 
nonwaivable, such constraints are necessary to ensure that those rights 
are not effectively waived by the imposition of an unfair or inadequate 
forum for their adjudication.59
So arbitration agreements are subject to challenge under three 
different bodies of law:  the FAA itself, generally applicable state law 
governing contracts, and the law governing the employee’s underlying 
substantive claim.  Under one or another of these (sometimes un-
specified) bodies of law, courts have struck down provisions that im-
pose too great a cost on employees in the form of excessive arbitrator 
fees;60 that limit a prevailing plaintiff’s ability to recover attorneys’ fees 
or punitive damages where the substantive law allows such recovery;61 
that put unreasonable time limits on the filing of claims;62 that do not 
allow reasonable discovery;63 that give the employer greater power 
over the selection of arbitrator;64 that are “one-sided” in covering em-
ployee but not employer claims;65 or that are “illusory” in that the em-
58 This phrase first appeared in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637, which decisively re-
jected the argument that statutory claims, including federal statutory claims, were 
categorically unsuitable or less suitable for arbitration. 
59 The argument here is infused with due process concerns, which are discussed 
below.  See infra text accompanying notes 89-95. 
60 See Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 270 (3d Cir. 2003); Fergu-
son v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 785-86 (9th Cir. 2002); Shankle v. 
B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999); Cole v. Burns 
Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
61 See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 673 n.15 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2003); Al-
exander, 341 F.3d at 267; McCaskill v. SCI Mgmt. Corp., 298 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
62 See Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175; Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266; Plaskett v. Bechtel Int’l, 
Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341-42 (D.V.I. 2003). 
63 See Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 786-87. 
64 See Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, Local 400, 289 
F.3d 297, 303 (4th Cir. 2002). 
65 See Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1173; Ferguson, 298 F.3d at 785; Gibson v. Neighborhood 
Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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ployer reserves the right to change any feature of the agreement at 
any time.66
Much of the judicial scrutiny of arbitration agreements is carried 
out under the formal umbrella of unconscionability doctrine, a com-
ponent of ordinary state contract law.  Of course, all contracts are sub-
ject to unconscionability constraints; one might argue that the courts 
are up to nothing new in holding mandatory arbitration agreements 
up to scrutiny under this doctrine—or that, if they are up to some-
thing new in these cases, they are violating the strictures of the FAA, 
which preempts state doctrines that single out arbitration agreements 
for hostile treatment.67  It appears, however, that unconscionability of-
ten serves as a doctrinal vehicle—a flawed vehicle, as I will later 
show—for protecting the employee’s underlying substantive rights 
and remedies.  An agreement that is skewed in the employer’s favor, 
or that sets up unreasonable hurdles to adjudication, threatens the 
vindication of the employee’s substantive rights every bit as much as 
an agreement that expressly bars a legally authorized remedy.  In 
other words, such an agreement operates to waive substantive rights of 
employees that the law deems nonwaivable. 
One might still parse this constellation of constraints on arbitra-
tion agreements into its separate parts and contend that nothing in-
terestingly hybrid is really happening.  Under the FAA, state contract 
law can condition the enforceability of these agreements only to the 
same extent that it conditions the enforceability of contracts gener-
ally; the constraints that substantive employment law places on these 
agreements merely enforce the nonwaivability of the underlying em-
ployee rights.  On that understanding, arbitration agreements amount 
to nothing more than the ordinary contractual waiver of the right to 
litigate nonwaivable rights—not a hybrid form but merely a specific 
application of the law of contract where it intersects with the domain 
of rights. 
66 See Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 939-40 (4th Cir. 1999); Perez v. 
Hospitality Ventures-Denver LLC, 245 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174-75 (D. Colo. 2003). 
67 Judge Easterbrook, in Oblix, Inc. v. Winiecki, thus noted that applying a height-
ened standard of unconscionability to arbitration agreements would be preempted by 
the FAA.  374 F.3d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 2004).  For an argument that California’s uncon-
scionability analysis of arbitration agreements is preempted, see Michael G. McGuin-
ness & Adam J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbitration:  Why This Road Less 
Traveled Will Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 61, 62.
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The sheer volume of doctrine arising out of these agreements 
suggests, however, that more is going on here than the application of 
ordinary contract law to agreements that affect ordinary rights.  First, 
the law does not permit the wholesale waiver, however “voluntary,” of 
the right to litigate nonwaivable employment claims; it permits only 
the substitution of a fair alternate forum—arbitration that deserves 
the name, with impartial decision makers and at least minimally fair 
and adequate procedures.68  The FAA’s requirements alone thus make 
the law of arbitration agreements an example of “conditional waivabil-
ity.”  The two other relevant bodies of law—the law governing con-
tracts generally, and the law governing the underlying claim—work in 
tandem to place additional conditions on the validity of arbitration 
agreements.  In particular, they guard against agreements that skew 
the process in the employer’s favor, or that otherwise impede the em-
ployee’s ability to invoke the arbitral forum or to effectively vindicate 
substantive rights.  That this scrutiny often takes place under the ru-
bric of unconscionability should not obscure the fact that something 
different is at work than ordinary contract law, nor should it condemn 
that extra scrutiny to FAA preemption.  We will return to this point in 
Part III below. 
One familiar with these cases cannot fail to recognize an emerging 
body of law that is specific to mandatory arbitration agreements, and 
that is evolving toward settled standards of fairness—adequate or oth-
erwise—that condition the enforceability of these agreements.  The 
law of mandatory arbitration agreements, like the law of non-compete 
covenants, straddles the divide between rights and contract by impos-
ing substantive conditions on contracts that waive certain rights. 
C.  Parallel Problems Arising out of Conditional Waivability 
A skeptical reader may still object to the parallel drawn here be-
tween these two disparate bodies of law, and to the very concept of 
68 For example, in Hooters of America, Inc., the Fourth Circuit struck down an “arbi-
tration agreement” that, in the court’s view, did not deserve to be called arbitration at 
all:  “Hooters materially breached the arbitration agreement by promulgating rules so 
egregiously unfair as to constitute a complete default of its contractual obligation to 
draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith.”  173 F.3d at 938.  Interestingly, as 
the foregoing passage indicates, the Hooters court invoked another doctrine that is part 
of the general law of contract:  the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
The agreement at issue was “so egregiously unfair,” however, that its invalidity was 
overdetermined; the same result could have been reached under unconscionability 
analysis, the “effectively vindicate” standard, or the FAA itself.
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conditional waivability that is said to unite them.  In both cases, the 
doctrine that I describe here as establishing conditions on the waiver 
of rights could be described differently.  The right to compete could 
be viewed not as a conditionally waivable right but as a partially waiv-
able right, or as a bundle of rights, some of which can be given up and 
some of which cannot.  The determination of which is which may be 
fact specific and complex, but it may not require the invention of a 
new category such as I have proffered.  Similarly, the right to litigate 
future rights claims might be described as an ordinary waivable right, 
behind which lies a nonwaivable right to a fair and impartial adjudica-
tory process.  Perhaps the term “conditional waivability” conflates 
what are really two unusual but different juxtapositions of waivable 
and nonwaivable rights. 
As a conceptual matter, I will provisionally concede that the law 
that I describe as setting conditions on waiver could also be described 
as drawing a line between the waivable and the nonwaivable compo-
nents of the right to compete, or as delineating the contours of the 
nonwaivable right to a fair hearing that lies behind the waivable right 
to litigate.  But I want to postpone discussion of whether anything is 
gained or lost by those alternative characterizations and whether they 
render illusory the concept of conditional waivability.  For if the claim 
is that these two bodies of law have rather little in common after all, 
then it may be useful first to delve a bit deeper into what they do have 
in common. 
The first thing that mandatory arbitration agreements and non-
compete agreements have in common is rather discouraging:  they 
generate an unusual number of disputes about their validity.69  That 
may be a reason for caution down the line when we consider whether 
to make broader use of conditional waivability.  For it may be precisely 
the intersection of rights and contract that makes these agreements 
such prolific sources of litigation.  The contractual platform enables 
parties—read “employers”—wide discretion in drafting agreements, 
and generates almost endless variety in the kinds of provisions that 
might be included.  Those provisions are potentially reviewable in 
court under multifaceted (and, in the case of arbitration agreements, 
still-evolving) legal standards that govern validity.  Conditionally waiv-
69 Professor Stone maintains that “disputes over ownership of human capital”—
mostly involving postemployment restraints on competition—“are becoming one of 
the most frequently litigated issues in the employment law field.”  STONE, supra note 
32, at 128. 
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able rights have neither the uniformity of ordinary rights nor the pre-
sumptive validity of ordinary contracts. 
In each case there is much controversy over whether these agree-
ments are subject to too little or too much judicial oversight.  That 
debate has a great deal to do with the basic tension between a rights 
approach and a contract approach to regulating employment.  Those 
who put much faith in the fairness and efficiency of contract call for 
more contractual freedom and less judicial oversight of both non-
compete and arbitration agreements.70  Those who weigh the underly-
ing rights at stake most heavily, or who are most skeptical of employ-
ees’ ability to bargain effectively for themselves, advocate for more rig-
orous scrutiny and higher standards for the validity of these 
agreements.71
Indeed, in each case there are those who contend that these con-
tracts should never, or almost never, be valid—that the rights that 
employees thereby give up ought not to be up for grabs by employers 
on what is almost inevitably an uneven bargaining table.72  They con-
70 See, e.g., Oblix, 374 F.3d at 491 (“It is hard to see how the arbitration clause is any 
more suspect, or any less enforceable, than the others—or, for that matter, than her 
salary.”); Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton, 192 F.3d 662, 670 (7th Cir. 1999) (“I can see 
no reason in today’s America for judicial hostility to covenants not to compete.”); cf. 
Arnow-Richman, supra note 28, at 1168 (proposing a shift in scrutiny away from the 
consequences of non-competes and toward the fairness of the agreement at the time of 
formation, with an eye toward “normaliz[ing] . . . these agreements from the perspec-
tive of contract law”).  In the case of arbitration, the dispute also reflects a division of 
opinion over the fairness and adequacy of arbitration itself.  Those who come to em-
ployment arbitration out of an arbitration background are generally more sanguine 
about it than those who come to employment arbitration from the perspective of em-
ployment law and employee rights. 
71 See, e.g., STONE, supra note 32, at 156 (advocating stricter scrutiny of non-
compete covenants in light of changing expectations about the employment contract); 
id. at 191 (advocating judicially imposed standards of due process on arbitration pro-
ceedings). 
72 For arguments against the enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements, 
see David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business:  Employee and Con-
sumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36 (“[W]here 
waiver of so important a right as access to the courts is imposed through a contractual 
form infamous for the absence of real consent, courts should draw a protective line by 
holding the form term at least presumptively unenforceable.”); Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of 
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1996) (arguing that these agreements 
“threaten[] to turn back the clock on workers’ rights”).  For arguments against the en-
forceability of (nearly all) covenants not to compete, see Eileen Silverstein, Bringing 
Forth a New World from the Ashes of the Old, 34 CONN. L. REV. 803, 815 (2002) (suggesting 
“that employees own their human capital and that the claim to knowledge acquired on 
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tend, in short, for placing the underlying entitlements into the more 
familiar and conventional category of “rights.”  But the law in each 
case has opted instead for this hybrid form of regulation. 
This particular hybrid of external public law and private contract 
gives rise to some characteristic problems that arise in strikingly paral-
lel form under both non-competes and arbitration agreements.  One 
question is whether such agreements can be made a condition of em-
ployment.  Employees who are—as most are—terminable at will, can 
presumptively be terminated for refusing to agree to any terms or to 
sign any agreement sought by the employer.  But because these 
agreements waive important rights, it has been argued that they must 
be voluntary, and that an agreement imposed under threat of dis-
charge is not voluntary.  Employees have mostly lost those arguments 
in both cases.73
the job as the ‘property’ of employers is historically wrong and morally offensive”) 
(footnotes omitted).
73 In the case of arbitration:  contrary to early rulings that consent to arbitration 
must be knowing and voluntary, see, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 
1304 (9th Cir. 1994), and not a condition of employment, see, e.g., Penn v. Ryan’s Fam-
ily Steakhouses, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 940, 941, 943 (W.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 269 F.3d 753 
(7th Cir. 2001), most courts have concluded that nothing more than ordinary contrac-
tual consent is required (or can be required, consistent with the FAA).  See Caley v. 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1371 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 2020 (2006); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 871 (2006); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837-38 (8th Cir. 
1997); Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 103 (Ill. 2006).  There is a sepa-
rate question under the unconscionability doctrine whether arbitration agreements 
that are imposed as a condition of employment are deemed “procedurally uncon-
scionable” contracts of adhesion, and thus subject to scrutiny for potential “substantive 
unconscionability” in their terms.  See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 In the non-compete context, the argument that a non-compete agreement is un-
enforceable if imposed as a condition of employment has had mixed success.  A num-
ber of courts have held that an initial promise of new employment, or possibly a pro-
motion to new job responsibilities, will support an otherwise valid covenant not to 
compete.  See, e.g., Milner Airco, Inc. v. Morris, 433 S.E.2d 811, 813 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1993); Wilmar, Inc. v. Corsillo, 210 S.E.2d 427, 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).  For a non-
compete promise executed during the employment, some courts have held that con-
tinued at-will employment is insufficient consideration.  See, e.g., IKON Office Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Belanger, 59 F. Supp. 2d 125, 131 (D. Mass. 1999); James C. Greene Co. v. 
Kelley, 134 S.E.2d 166, 168 (N.C. 1964); Maint. Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 314 A.2d 
279, 281 (Pa. 1974); Martin v. Credit Prot. Ass’n, 793 S.W.2d 667, 669-70 (Tex. 1990).  
Other courts have held the opposite, enforcing agreements that were imposed as a 
condition of continued employment.  See, e.g., Mattison v. Johnston, 730 P.2d 286, 288 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Abel v. Fox, 654 N.E.2d 591, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Canter v. 
Tucker, 674 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Copeco, Inc. v. Caley, 632 N.E.2d 
1299, 1301 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992). 
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However, the problem is posed in a more acute form—and in a 
form that is characteristic of conditionally waivable rights—when the 
agreement that is presented as a condition of employment is invalid 
because it violates one or more of the law’s constraints.  If the em-
ployer were to seek eventually to enforce the agreement, it would be 
found partially or entirely void regardless of the circumstances in 
which the employee agreed to it.  But if an at-will employee refuses to 
sign an overbroad non-compete agreement or an unfair arbitration 
agreement, can the employer fire her?  Or is such a discharge con-
trary to public policy and actionable as an exception to employment at 
will?  The same question arises with both non-compete covenants and 
arbitration agreements.74  The right answer turns on an understand-
ing of what rights and interests are at stake and how conditional waiv-
ability needs to work to protect those rights and interests, questions to 
which we will turn shortly. 
Another problem that is common to these agreements, and that 
arises out of the peculiar feature of conditional waivability, is the issue 
of severability.75  If one or more provisions of the contract is invalid 
under external law, does this invalidate the agreement as a whole—
leaving the employee free to litigate or to compete with the former 
employer—or should the court sever invalid clauses, and either strike 
or reform them, while upholding the remainder of the agreement?76  
In both cases, most courts lean toward severance and toward enforc-
ing the reformed agreement, unless the agreement is egregiously un-
fair or overbroad.  Courts thus tend to reform or strike overbroad 
provisions of non-competes, but otherwise enforce them, absent evi-
74 In the context of non-competes, compare D’sa v. Playhut, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
495, 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that discharge for refusal to sign an invalid non-
compete was wrongful discharge in violation of public policy), with Maw v. Advanced 
Clinical Commc’ns, Inc., 846 A.2d 604, 608 (N.J. 2004) (finding no public policy im-
plicated by discharge for refusal to sign non-compete covenant), and Tatge v. Cham-
bers & Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Wis. 1998) (same). 
 In the context of arbitration agreements, the court in Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, 
Hamilton & Scripps LLP held that no public policy was offended by the discharge of an 
employee for refusing to sign an arbitration agreement that itself violated no clear 
public policy, but it left open the possibility that such a discharge would be actionable 
if the underlying arbitration agreement were clearly invalid.  88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 672 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
75 In principle the issue can arise with any contract, some term of which is, for ex-
ample, contrary to public policy.  The issue arises much more often in the case of these 
two agreements because there are many more constraints on their terms. 
76 In both cases, the answer may depend to some degree on whether the agree-
ment contains a severability clause.  But even if it does, a court may refuse to sever in 
the case of pervasively unfair or overbroad agreements.  See infra notes 77-78. 
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dence of bad faith on the part of the drafter.77  Similarly, most courts 
will strike or edit invalid provisions of an arbitration agreement and 
then compel arbitration, unless the agreement is pervasively unfair.78
More striking than the parallel resolutions of this issue, however, 
are the parallel concerns animating the debate.  In both cases, the ar-
gument against severance, and for invalidating the whole agreement 
at a relatively low trigger point, is that this approach raises the cost of 
contravening legal standards and induces the employer to stay within 
the law in drafting the agreement (as they are understood to do more 
or less unilaterally).  Judicial willingness to edit or reform agreements, 
by contrast, may invite employers to overreach.  In the non-compete 
context, for example, 
[t]oo great a readiness on the part of courts to preserve the valid por-
tions of overbroad restrictions would induce employers to draft such re-
strictions overbroadly, intimidating [employees] by the ostensible terms 
of the written contract and relying on courts to enforce the valid portion 
against an employee who is not intimidated.
79
77 See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 725-26 (3d ed. 2005).  While 
the “modern trend” is thus to reform overbroad covenants unless they are “deliberately 
unreasonable,” id. at 726, some courts take one of two stricter views:  some hold that 
overbroad covenants cannot be enforced at all.  Id. at 725; see, e.g., Rector-Phillips-
Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 489 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ark. 1973) (refusing to enforce for any period 
of time an agreement that called for a three-year ban on competition).  A smaller 
number of courts follow the “blue pencil” rule, under which they may delete offending 
provisions (but not rewrite them) and enforce the remainder of the agreement if it is 
then reasonable.  ROTHSTEIN, supra, at 726; e.g., Licocci v. Cardinal Assocs., Inc., 432 
N.E.2d 446, 453 (Ind. App. 1982), vacated, 445 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 1983). 
78 That is, unless the court concludes that the employer acted in “bad faith or in 
an attempt to contravene public policy,” or “numerous invalid or biased provisions in 
an agreement combine to undermine the validity of an agreement.”  Booker v. Robert 
Half Int’l, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 94, 108-09 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Ingle v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 
940 (4th Cir. 1999); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th 
Cir. 1994)).
79 Webcraft Techs., Inc. v. McCaw, 674 F. Supp. 1039, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).  Simi-
larly, a Georgia court, in rejecting the blue pencil rule, noted: 
Employers covenant for more than is necessary, hope their employees will 
thereby be deterred from competing, and rely on the courts to rewrite the 
agreements so as to make them enforceable if their employees do compete.  
When courts adopt severability of covenants not to compete, employee com-
petition will be deterred even more than it is at present by these overly broad 
covenants against competition. 
Howard Schultz & Assocs., Inc. v. Broniec, 236 S.E.2d 265, 269 (Ga. 1977); see also Phil-
lip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude:  The Current Judicial En-
forcement of Employee Covenants Not To Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 
531, 547 (1984) (arguing that judicial reform of overbroad covenants “encourage[s] 
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If the worst that can happen is that the offending clauses will be struck 
in the event of judicial review, why not take the chance?  There may 
be no judicial review at all.  In the meantime, an unlawfully broad or 
skewed agreement may accomplish the employer’s illegitimate pur-
pose.  An overbroad non-compete—one that lasts too long or that 
covers activities that do not threaten the employer’s legitimate inter-
ests—may deter the employee from quitting and competing even 
when she has a right to do so, or it may deter a competitor from hir-
ing the employee.80  A skewed arbitration agreement—one that gives 
the employer its pick of arbitrators or denies attorneys’ fees to prevail-
ing plaintiffs—may deter the employee from litigating her claim or 
deter an attorney from taking the case.81
Even in this comparatively minor lacuna of the law, the parallels 
between the two legal doctrines, and between the concerns that ani-
mate competing views, suggest again that these two areas of employ-
ment law have more in common than first meets the eye.  Enough 
unites them at a structural level to warrant digging one level deeper in 
search of some common explanation for the choice of this hybrid 
form of regulation, instead of either an ordinary contract or an ordi-
nary rights-like approach. 
II.  THE LOGIC OF CONDITIONALLY WAIVABLE RIGHTS 
What explains the choice of conditional waivability as opposed to 
the more familiar poles of the rights-contract spectrum?  I am not 
looking for a causal or historical explanation, but for more of a justifi-
cation:  why should the rights at stake in arbitration and non-compete 
agreements be waivable at all?  And if they are to be waivable, why only 
under substantive conditions specified by external law?  If the reasons 
for “conditional waivability” in the two cases were unrelated and 
grounded entirely in the substantive policies at stake, then there 
employers to be ‘unreasonable’ in drafting covenants”); accord Arnow-Richman, supra 
note 5, at 167.   
80 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 77, at 725-26. 
81 See, e.g., Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 
2001), vacated by 294 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (refusing to sever an invalid provision 
limiting employee remedies, and declining to compel arbritration, because this “would 
reward the employer for its actions and fail to deter similar conduct by others”).  But 
see Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 682 n.7 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
the “no-severance rule” because the incentive that severance may give employers to 
include invalid terms is offset by the disincentive produced by the cost of litigating over 
those provisions). 
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would not be much to say about them that has not already been said 
in the voluminous commentary on each of these two types of agree-
ments.  But I believe that non-compete covenants and arbitration 
agreements reach parallel solutions to parallel problems.  Beneath 
their widely divergent policy preoccupations, they share a deeper logic 
that points toward the middle ground of conditional waivability. 
A.  Why Not Contract? 
Let us begin with some reasons for rejecting the default solution 
of ordinary contract or its close cousin, ordinary waivability.  The first 
and most important point to notice is that both agreements steer very 
close to, and risk treading upon, employee rights that are themselves 
nonwaivable or inalienable.  Indeed, in each case those endangered 
rights not only are nonwaivable but also reflect constitutional con-
cerns. 
Non-compete covenants do not merely restrain competition; they 
also relinquish aspects of the employee’s right to dispose of her labor 
and to work in her chosen occupation after employment has ceased.  
The freedom of labor has a fascinating legal history, one that has been 
intertwined at times with the abolitionist movement and at other times 
with the Lochner era’s “liberty of contract.”82  Sometimes the freedom 
of labor has been depicted as a means to competitive labor markets, 
but it has also been understood as basic to the individual’s economic 
liberty and welfare.83  Broad postemployment restrictions on an indi-
vidual’s freedom to work in her occupation are obviously in tension 
with both dimensions of the freedom of labor. 
But perhaps the most troubling effect of non-compete covenants 
is that, by limiting what the employee can do after leaving the job, 
they also burden the ability to quit, and with it the ability to demand 
better wages and working conditions and to resist oppressive condi-
tions in the current job.  The Supreme Court has described the right 
to quit, guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, as a critical “de-
82 For a brilliant elucidation of these themes, see Forbath, supra note 11. 
83 See cases cited supra note 51.  For other cases emphasizing the individual free-
dom to work as a reason for policing postemployment non-compete covenants, see 
Woolley’s Laundry, Inc. v. Silva, 23 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Mass. 1939); Bennett v. Storz 
Broad. Co., 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (Minn. 1965); Healthcare Servs. of the Ozarks, Inc. v. 
Copeland, No. SC 87083, 2006 WL 2257015, at *3 (Mo. Aug. 8, 2006); Grebing v. First 
Nat’l Bank of Cape Girardeau, 613 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Arthur 
Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (Ohio Ct. Com. 
Pl. 1952); Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 886 A.2d 365, 369-70 (Vt. 2005). 
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fense against oppressive hours, pay, working conditions, or treat-
ment . . . . When the master can compel and the laborer cannot es-
cape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress and 
no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome 
conditions of work.”84  The right to quit is thus inalienable.85
Of course, a contractual restraint on postemployment activities is 
not the same as a waiver of the right to quit; however, such a restraint 
clearly impairs the practical ability to quit, and with it the ability to re-
sist oppression.86  Given the contractual nature of the employment re-
lationship, most of what matters to employees depends on their bar-
gaining power, and their bargaining power depends at least as much 
on their ability to quit and work elsewhere as on their vulnerability to 
discharge.87  There is no doubt that a broad postemployment restraint 
impairs both the ability to quit and the bargaining power that it en-
tails.  A carpenter who gives up the right to practice carpentry within 
500 miles of the employer for 10 years after termination of employ-
ment may find that quitting is nearly unthinkable, for it would reduce 
the employee to low-paying unskilled work; if quitting is unthinkable, 
then a threat to quit over unsatisfactory wages or working conditions 
lacks credibility.  An extremely broad waiver of the right to work else-
where after quitting, such as would be permitted under an ordinary 
contractual treatment of these agreements, comes very close in effect 
to contracting away one’s inalienable right to quit.  So the pall of the 
Thirteenth Amendment and its ban on involuntary servitude hangs 
over these agreements.88
84 Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944). 
85 See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 179, 195 (1986); Lea S. VenderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438 (1989).  For a critical take on the inalienability of the right 
to quit, see Wonnell, supra note 13, at 89 (positing that an inalienable right to leave 
employment harms employees). 
86 To be sure, the practical ability to quit may be compromised by any number of 
economic practicalities, such as seniority rights or health and pension benefits that 
may not be replaceable on the external job market.  But those are benefits that the law 
does not require the employer to offer at all; they may be seen as “carrots” that induce 
employees to stay.  By contrast, inducing employees to stay by restricting their pre-
sumptive right to work elsewhere after quitting looks more like the use of a “stick,” and 
should arouse much greater legal suspicion. 
87 Employees with job security—a right not to be fired without cause—can more 
freely protest or reject disagreeable demands or conditions of employment than one 
employed at will.  But at-will employees still have leverage if they are free to quit and 
the employer wants them to stay. 
88 See Hendrik Hartog, Stone’s Transitions, 34 CONN. L. REV. 821, 823 (2002) 
(equating non-competition agreements with “debt peonage” and “slavery by con-
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For their part, arbitration agreements waive the right to litigate 
over rights that are themselves nonwaivable—for example, the right 
not to be subject to race discrimination.  A waiver of the right to liti-
gate future discrimination claims, if not coupled with an adequate 
substitute mode of adjudication, effectively waives the underlying right 
itself.  There is no doubt, of course, that a discrimination claim may be 
waived or settled after it has arisen; accordingly, agreements to arbi-
trate existing disputes are uncontroversial.  But employees cannot 
waive ex ante the right to be free from discrimination, and that is what 
they would do, in effect, by agreeing to a highly skewed or prohibi-
tively expensive arbitration process as the exclusive avenue for vindi-
cating future discrimination claims.  Such an agreement would insu-
late the employer from liability for future misconduct and function 
like a waiver of antidiscrimination rights themselves.  This is the pri-
mary reason why a waiver of the right to litigate future discrimination 
claims in favor of arbitration warrants close scrutiny. 
Of course, the range of nonwaivable substantive employee rights 
that are at stake in arbitration agreements runs a wide gamut from 
very basic civil rights under Title VII, to the right to time-and-a-half 
pay for overtime, to some genuinely picayune “rights.”  What, one 
might ask, holds these substantive rights together or qualifies them as 
fundamental, much less constitutional?  What holds them together is 
not their substance but the system of rights enforcement itself.  For 
behind the scenes, but rarely on stage, in discussions of arbitration is 
the constitutional right to due process of law.89
Whether or not it is true that for every legal right there must be a 
remedy,90 it must be true that where the law grants both a right and a 
tract”); VanderVelde, supra note 85, at 495 (“By abolishing slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude, the framers of the thirteenth amendment sought to advance both a floor of 
minimum rights for all working men and an unobstructed sky of opportunities for 
their advancement.”); cf. Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 
VA. L. REV. 383, 410-12 (1993) (recognizing, but criticizing, the restrictions on non-
compete covenants and their roots in Thirteenth Amendment considerations).
89 Here I argue only that due process concerns lie behind the law governing man-
datory arbitration.  A full-blown argument that mandatory arbitration (or a particular 
mandatory arbitration agreement) is a denial of due process of law would require 
more detailed consideration of (1) what process is due in connection with the adjudi-
cation of nonwaivable employment claims; (2) what would count as a valid waiver of 
due process rights; and (3) whether the judicial enforcement of an arbitration agree-
ment that does not meet due process standards is state action for purposes of establish-
ing a due process violation.  On the last point, see infra note 95. 
90 So held the first Justice Marshall, on the authority of no less than Blackstone.  
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[I]t is a general and in-
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remedy—that is, a claim for legal redress—that carries with it the right 
to a fair process for adjudicating the claim.91  In other words, a sub-
stantive legal right and claim for relief is a property interest of which 
one may not be deprived without due process of law.92  Due process 
does not necessarily mean judicial process.  Arbitration can supply the 
essentials of due process:  an opportunity to discover relevant facts 
and present evidence and arguments at an adversarial hearing before 
an impartial decision maker.93  However, those essentials can no more 
be waived than can the underlying rights or remedies.  That is, if the 
underlying substantive legal right is itself nonwaivable ex ante, then so 
must be the right to a fair adjudication of a future claim that the right 
has been violated, for a predispute waiver of a fair process for adjudi-
cating future rights claims operates as a waiver of the underlying 
rights themselves.94  Relegating an individual to an unfair arbitration 
process for a viable substantive legal claim arguably deprives her of 
property without due process of law. 
The due process issue is complicated by the private nature of the 
waiver or arbitration agreement that is being enforced.  As a matter of 
positive law, it is unclear whether judicial enforcement of such a 
waiver—that is, of a predispute arbitration agreement whose proce-
dures do not meet constitutional due process standards—counts as 
disputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law, whenever that right is invaded . . . . [I]t is a settled and invariable princi-
ple in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and 
every injury its proper redress.” (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23, 
*109) (quotation marks omitted))). 
91 Judge Harry Edwards recognized this principle and its implications for arbitra-
tion.  See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“[S]tatutory rights include both a substantive protection and access to a neutral forum 
in which to enforce those protections.”). 
92 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (citing Mullane v. 
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). 
93 In determining what process is due, due process jurisprudence is sensitive to 
context and often tolerant of a degree of informality and expedition.  But it does de-
mand at least “some form of hearing” before an impartial decision maker.  See Marshall 
v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976). 
94 For elaboration of this argument, see Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482; Richard A. Bales, A 
Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 37, on file with author).  Once a legal claim has 
accrued, of course, one can waive or settle it, and with it the right to a hearing.  There 
is, again, a basic distinction between giving up one’s legal rights ex ante—before any 
claim has accrued—and ex post, when the nature of the claim is at least knowable. 
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state action.95  But it certainly raises due process concerns analogous 
to the Thirteenth Amendment concerns that attend the enforcement 
of a broad non-compete covenant.  In the end, the invocation of con-
stitutional due process concerns does not so much add to as it fortifies 
the Supreme Court’s instruction in Gilmer that arbitration agreements 
must allow plaintiffs to effectively vindicate their statutory claims in 
the arbitral forum.  One can waive the right to litigate future claims in 
court in favor of arbitration, but one cannot waive the right to a fair 
adjudication of one’s future claims. 
It is striking that both non-compete agreements and arbitration 
agreements pose a potential threat to adjacent employee rights that 
are nonwaivable and constitutionally grounded.  This one common 
feature will take us a good distance toward explaining why these par-
ticular agreements are subject to unusually close supervision.  It will 
also provide a platform from which to assess existing law in Part III.  
But that is not the only common feature of these agreements that 
militates against ordinary contractual treatment. 
Both agreements also have recognized public externalities; that is, 
the public has some stake beyond that of the individual parties in the 
vitality of the rights being waived.  Non-compete agreements obviously 
95 For arguments that state action may exist in such circumstances, see Richard C. 
Reuben, Public Justice:  Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 577, 615-19 (1997) (suggesting that judicial enforcement of arbitration 
agreements inherently makes them the product of state action); Jean R. Sternlight, Re-
thinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration:  A Fresh 
Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 
44 (1997) (arguing that state action may be found in judicial interpretation of the FAA 
to require arbitration under ambiguous agreements to arbitrate).  The state action ar-
gument rests not only on the notoriously narrow authority of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1, 23 (1948) (finding state action in judicial enforcement of racially discrimina-
tory private covenants restricting the alienability of residential property), but also on 
the courts’ invocation of the FAA and the federal policy favoring arbitration to compel 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Still, the state action question is compli-
cated by the waiver issue.  Some courts that have confronted the question have found 
no state action in the enforcement of private arbitration agreements.  See Desiderio v. 
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 
457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)); Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 
1200-02 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton 
& Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003); Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 
1192 (11th Cir. 1995); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. 
Supp. 1460, 1468 (N.D. Ill. 1997); see also Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitra-
tion, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 205-06 (2006) (supporting the finding of no state action in 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements).  For present purposes it is enough to 
identify the due process concerns that lie behind the law governing arbitration.  But 
the state action question would require closer attention in a thorough due process 
analysis of mandatory arbitration agreements. 
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stifle competition; they run into the venerable public policy against 
contracts in restraint of trade.  Mandatory arbitration not only risks 
compromising the public interest in enforcing the substantive em-
ployee rights at issue. Even when it preserves those rights and reme-
dies, it may detract from the public character of the enforcement of 
public law rights in the workplace setting—the elucidation of prece-
dent and public norms, for example—by relegating the dispute to a 
private forum and private actors whose decisions may not be publi-
cized. 
These two considerations together—the proximity of inalienable 
employee rights and the negative public spillover from these agree-
ments—point to a third common feature:  in each case the law de-
nominates certain rational employer aims as illegitimate.  In the case of 
non-competes, the law is quite explicit:  while it is legitimate for em-
ployers to seek to protect certain limited interests, such as trade se-
crets, it is illegitimate to seek to quash competition as such from the 
former employee or bind the employee to the job by proscribing al-
ternative employment.  In the case of arbitration agreements, while it 
is legitimate for employers to seek to reduce the overall cost of adjudi-
cating employment disputes by substituting a more streamlined and 
informal arbitral forum, it is illegitimate to seek insulation from liabil-
ity itself—for example, by skewing the selection of decision makers or 
limiting legally prescribed remedies. 
In both cases, employers have an incentive to overreach—to use 
these agreements to impair employees’ inalienable rights, injure the 
public interest, or both.  The loss of a valued employee, especially to a 
competitor, is undesirable; the employer may be tempted to secure as 
much insulation from that loss, and from that future competition, as 
its market power will permit.  Similarly, liability for employment 
claims is anathema to employers, who may be tempted to use arbitra-
tion agreements not merely to substitute one neutral forum for an-
other, but also to curtail liability by stacking the deck in the em-
ployer’s favor.  So both types of agreements can be used, and 
employers will be tempted to use them, to advance illegitimate em-
ployer aims.  Those illegitimate aims are simply the flipside of the 
nonwaivable employee rights and public interests that these agree-
ments risk impairing.  Still, recognizing the employer’s temptation to 
overreach, and to impair nonwaivable rights or public interests, un-
derscores the need for public oversight of these agreements. 
In both cases, employers are at least theoretically constrained 
from overreaching by market forces:  some employees may recognize 
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these costs, balk at an unfair agreement, or choose a more fair-
minded employer.  But many employees will not.  Indeed, many will 
not in part because of another striking similarity between these 
agreements:  both waive rights that will become operative only upon 
the occurrence of a future event that is remote, uncertain, and often 
undesirable (the right to work for a competitor after the current job 
ends, and the right to litigate a future dispute with the employer, usu-
ally in connection with discharge).  That is unlike most contractual 
terms of the employment relationship—such as wages, hours, job du-
ties, or working conditions—which take effect more or less immedi-
ately.96  Arbitration and non-compete agreements constrain employ-
ees only in a fairly remote and uncertain future event; and we may 
expect employees to overdiscount the likelihood of these events or the 
importance of the rights at stake.  Cognitive biases or informational 
asymmetries might thus aggravate concerns about the fairness of bar-
gains struck at an earlier point, especially at the outset of employ-
ment, when questions about the forum in which one might later sue 
the employer, or about one’s ability to compete with the employer af-
ter termination, are likely to tarnish the appeal of an applicant or new 
employee.  All of this might make it easier for employers to overreach 
and invade employee rights. 
These are, of course, among the recurring objections to relying on 
the market and on contract in the employment context.  In particular, 
they feature prominently among critiques of the presumption that 
employment is terminable at will.97  But even if these bargaining im-
96 Other terms of employment, such as pensions, take effect in the remote future 
(though the accumulation of assets in defined contribution plans may help to concre-
tize the benefits).  But again, there is a legally significant difference between terms 
that confer optional benefits (which employees may be inclined to undervalue because 
of their deferred nature) and terms that waive important employee rights under public 
law.  The former may be an occasion for useful legal intervention, see, e.g., Colin 
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:  Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asym-
metric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1227-30 (2003) (describing methods of en-
couraging retirement saving by changing default rules), but the latter may demand it. 
97 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 1792-93 (arguing on these grounds for pen-
alty default rules that are less favorable to employers than the at-will doctrine); Walter 
Kamiat, Labor and Lemons:  Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible 
Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1955-56 (1996) (arguing that 
bargaining impediments discourage employees from contracting for job security); 
Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information:  A Study of Worker Perceptions of Le-
gal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (adducing em-
pirical evidence that employees overestimate their legal rights when contracting for 
employment); Sunstein, supra note 25, at 108 (marshalling several arguments for creat-
ing employee-friendly default rules). 
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pediments fall short as a justification for mandating job security or 
other benefits, in some contexts they may converge with concerns 
about externalities and the erosion of inalienable employee rights to 
justify stacking the deck in favor of the employee’s entitlement and 
against its contractual waiver. 
B.  Why Not Mandatory Employee Rights? 
So far, all of the common features of arbitration agreements and 
non-compete covenants that we have identified—the proximity of in-
alienable employee rights, the problem of public externalities, the 
employer’s incentive to overreach and to pursue illegitimate objec-
tives, and the bargaining impediments posed by the remote and un-
certain nature of the constraint—point in the same direction:  against 
the market mechanism of contract.  The question remains:  why the 
middle ground of conditional waivability as opposed to the more con-
ventional solution of nonwaivable rights?  Are there affirmative rea-
sons for allowing these contracts at all—that is, for allowing even the 
regulated waiver of the rights to litigate future legal claims in court 
and to compete with the employer after termination of employment? 
In neither case is this an idle question, for serious observers have 
contended for the categorical invalidity of mandatory arbitration 
agreements and the nearly categorical prohibition of non-competes.98  
Some of their arguments are specific to the policies or rights at stake 
in each type of agreement.  Others echo themes that recur in every 
effort to take some term or condition of employment off the bargain-
ing table:  the employee rights at stake are too important to be sub-
jected to the vagaries of bargaining, given the leverage that employers 
bring to the table. 
By and large, those arguments have not carried the day.99  In the 
case of arbitration agreements, the Supreme Court has held that em-
ployees may waive the right to litigate state and federal employment 
claims, including discrimination claims, subject to standards of fair 
arbitration that are drawn from the FAA, the substantive law govern-
ing the underlying claim, and the state law of contracts.  Mandatory 
arbitration agreements remain controversial.  But for now the right to 
litigate future employment claims has been declared conditionally 
waivable. 
98 See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
  
2006] A HYBRID FORM OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 415 
 
In the case of non-compete covenants, California comes close to 
rejecting them categorically.100  In effect, the right to compete with 
one’s former employer is nonwaivable in California.  Most states, how-
ever, admit a wider range of legitimate employer interests and allow 
“reasonable” non-compete provisions—those that are narrowly tai-
lored to protect legitimate interests.  The validity and scope of non-
compete covenants is becoming more controversial as employees be-
come more mobile and more dependent on their access to external 
job markets, and as employers become less inclined to offer long-term 
employment and more aggressive in their use of these agreements to 
capture what even lower-level employees know about their products, 
services, markets, and customers.101  Still, the right to engage in 
postemployment competition with one’s employer has long been, and 
is likely to remain, partially and conditionally waivable in most juris-
dictions. 
So what justifies permitting these agreements at all, given the ar-
ray of reasons for constraining them?  Of course any persuasive justifi-
cation would have to be grounded in the particular interests and poli-
cies at stake in each case.  But I mean to ask the question at a level of 
generality that permits comparison of the two cases.  At the most gen-
eral level, there might be employer interests or rights, employee in-
terests or rights, or public interests that weigh in favor of the enforce-
ability of arbitration and non-compete agreements.  Let us examine 
each briefly. 
Employer Interests or Rights:  It is tempting to say that the claim that 
these agreements serve the interests of employers should not count as a 
justification for permitting them.  After all, agreements to accept 
subminimum wages or discriminatory treatment may serve employers’ 
interests, but we do not allow those agreements at all.  But we should 
distinguish between employers’ illegitimate interests and their legiti-
mate interests.  Employer interests that are intrinsically at odds with 
the employee rights or public interests at stake, such as an interest in 
restraining competition from former employees or in barring employ-
ees’ legal claims, obviously cannot count as reasons for allowing these 
agreements.  But the law generally counts as legitimate an employer’s 
interest in protecting long-term client relationships against the em-
ployee’s competition, or in lowering the cost of the dispute resolution 
process.  Those employer interests presumably do count in favor of 
100 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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allowing these agreements.  But it is not clear that they can count for 
much.  Given that these agreements risk impairing both inalienable 
employee rights and public interests, employer interest alone seems to 
fall short as a justification for allowing them. 
On the other hand, some legitimate employer interests fall into a 
weightier subcategory of employer rights—that is, entitlements that ex-
ternal law recognizes and protects independent of the terms of the 
employment contract.102  In the case of arbitration agreements, the 
potential for conflicting rights is entirely theoretical, for there is noth-
ing one could call an employer right at stake in those agreements.  
There is a potential for conflicting rights, however, in the case of non-
compete agreements that protect trade secrets.  Trade secrets are di-
rectly protected against misappropriation by former employees and 
others, even in the absence of a covenant not to compete.103  But non-
compete covenants are said to provide an extra layer of protection 
that is sometimes necessary in light of the difficulties of detecting mis-
appropriation.  Some non-competes—those that protect employers’ 
trade secrets—may thus be justified as necessary to protect independ-
ently recognized employer rights. 
Note that even these employer rights are not on par with the inal-
ienable employee rights at stake in these agreements.  Trade secrets 
are ordinary property rights and are fully alienable.  So, where non-
compete covenants are necessary to protect trade secrets, that would 
surely count as a reason to allow them, but those employer rights are 
still trumped by inalienable employee rights where those are in-
fringed.  An agreement that is necessary to protect (alienable) em-
ployer rights is still not justified if it will necessarily infringe upon inal-
ienable employee rights.104
102 As in the case of employee rights, I take existing external law on this score as a 
given. 
103 To be sure, the definition of “trade secrets” is malleable and expanding.  Un-
der the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, followed in most states, it has come to include vir-
tually any information that is both commercially valuable and kept reasonably secret.  
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (amended 1985).  That goes 
beyond the traditional compass of trade secrets and effectively allows employers to 
make any potentially valuable information into a trade secret if it is capable of being 
closely held, by requiring employees to sign broad “confidentiality agreements.”  But I 
take the current definition of trade secrets as given here. 
104 If the non-compete barred only employment that would inevitably result in dis-
closure of trade secrets, then it might seem that no employee right would be at issue.  
Indeed, where disclosure is inevitable given the nature of the new job, some courts 
would enjoin the former employee even absent a non-compete covenant.  See Pepsico, 
Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding an injunction against 
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So the affirmative case for allowing arbitration agreements and 
most non-competes (other than those that are necessary to protect 
trade secrets) rests thus far on the rather shaky ground of employer 
interest.  It remains to ask whether these agreements—either arbitra-
tion agreements or non-competes—can be justified on the basis of 
employee or public interests. 
Employee Interests:  At this point, contract enthusiasts may simply 
harken back to the general brief for freedom of contract and market 
ordering.  Contract is said to be an efficient mechanism for allocating 
entitlements in accordance with the parties’ preferences.  Even con-
tractual provisions that appear burdensome to employees may be pre-
sumed mutually beneficial where freely bargained, if only by virtue of 
what the apparently burdened party presumably received in exchange.  
Of course, in the employment setting these presumptions seem heroic 
at best to many observers.  That is especially true here, given the pres-
ence of public interests and the proximity of nonwaivable employee 
rights. 
But we might put a little substantive meat on those formalistic 
bones by pointing out that both arbitration and non-compete agree-
ments are said to have built-in benefits for employees as well as em-
ployers—not only some presumed trade-off elsewhere in the employ-
ment contract, but particular benefits that flow from the agreements 
themselves.  They are touted as “win-win” propositions.  Non-compete 
covenants are said to benefit employees by freeing employers to share 
valuable information, making employees more productive and earn-
ing them a higher wage during employment.  Arbitration is said to be 
faster, cheaper, and more accessible than litigation; employees may 
find it easier to get a hearing and even some relief.105  This quid pro 
employment with a competitor on these grounds).  The “inevitable disclosure” doc-
trine effectively implies a non-compete covenant in rare cases, and is highly controver-
sial.  Whatever its merits, it cannot rest on the proposition that no employee right is at 
stake, for the employee is losing not just the non-right to appropriate trade secrets, but 
the larger right to engage in one’s occupation, including in competition with the em-
ployer. 
105 A party agreeing to submit claims to arbitration gives up no substantive rights 
or remedies; she simply “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the 
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”  Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).  The quid pro 
quo of arbitration distinguishes predispute arbitration agreements from predispute 
agreements to waive the right to a jury trial or to participate in aggregate or class ac-
tions (that, plus the utter lack of statutory authority for the latter).  A jury trial waiver 
or class action waiver for future disputes simply takes away part of the employee’s pri-
vate enforcement arsenal, and reduces the law’s deterrent impact, without giving any-
  
418 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 379 
 
quo was central to the Court’s explanation of why it was acceptable to 
subject statutory claims to mandatory arbitration.106  Of course, that 
would only explain why employees might voluntarily agree to arbitrate 
an existing dispute.  To demonstrate that employees benefit from 
mandatory arbitration agreements requires a further showing that em-
ployee access to arbitration depends on its being mandatory; that is, 
that employers will only agree to arbitrate the cases that employees 
want to arbitrate (for example, lower-value claims) if they can also 
bind employees to arbitrate the cases that employees would prefer to 
litigate (for example, cases with potentially large noneconomic dam-
ages).107  In other words, the claim must be that these agreements—
and this is true of both arbitration agreements and non-competes—
benefit employees as well as employers ex ante.  At the time of en-
thing in return.  It poses some of the same risks to employees’ inalienable rights that 
arbitration agreements pose, but promises no countervailing benefits to employees.  
Arbitration agreements, of course, necessarily entail waiving a jury trial; the question of 
whether they may contain a class action waiver is taken up below.  See infra text accom-
panying note 122.  But arbitration agreements are also supposed to deliver benefits to 
employees. 
106 It is therefore crucial to know more than we do about how many employment 
cases are actually arbitrated.  Arnold Zack, a prominent labor arbitrator and expert on 
arbitration, has gathered some data on this question.  He initially suspected that, with 
eight to twelve million employees covered by such systems, there would be tens or hun-
dreds of thousands of arbitration cases, as well as a large “gray market” of employer-
dominated arbitration providers.  However, his extensive informal inquiries (among 
designating agencies and attorneys who advise employers on developing arbitration 
systems) suggested that, while there is not much of a “gray market,” fewer than four 
thousand employment disputes per year are actually arbitrated.  E-mail from Arthur 
Zack to author (Oct. 21, 2006) (on file with author).  Zack found that most employer 
systems do appear to use established, reputable agencies that adhere to the Due Proc-
ess Protocol to increase the legitimacy and acceptability of arbitration.  As for actual 
arbitrations, he concluded that most were conducted under the auspices of the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association; other designating agencies each do no more than a few 
hundred cases per year.  If these preliminary findings are borne out by more system-
atic research, they would contradict some of the harshest critiques of employment ar-
bitration, which question the impartiality of this employer-driven system; however, they 
would also deal a serious blow to the standard case for arbitration, which rests in part 
on the claim that arbitration affords employees greater access to an impartial hearing.  
The very small number of arbitrations suggests that employees are not enjoying readier 
access to a fair hearing pursuant to arbitration agreements, but are simply settling or 
giving up their claims under the shadow of arbitration rather than under the heavier 
shadow of litigation. 
107 For arguments and some evidence to that effect, see Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the 
Frying Pan, into the Fire:  The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313 (2003); David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two:  Why Post-
Dispute Voluntary Arbitration Programs Will Fail To Fix the Problems Associated with Employ-
ment Discrimination Law Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2003). 
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forcement, the advantage presumably runs to the party seeking en-
forcement, almost invariably the employer, and against the party seek-
ing to litigate (or compete). 
The supposed “win-win” potential of these agreements is an im-
portant part of the case for allowing them in spite of the threat to em-
ployee rights and public interests.  If mandatory arbitration agree-
ments and non-compete covenants can benefit employees as well as 
employers, that would weigh in favor of allowing them, subject to 
conditions that protect nonwaivable employee rights and public inter-
ests, instead of banning them altogether.  It remains to consider 
whether some public interest might weigh in favor of allowing these 
agreements (thus offsetting or outweighing the public interest on the 
other side). 
Public interests:  The only societal benefits that would add to the 
case in favor of non-competes or arbitration agreements would be 
those that are external to the parties, for the legitimate benefits to 
employers and employees are already being counted.  In the case of 
non-competes, it is possible that employers’ greater willingness to ex-
pose employees to valuable information yields external benefits be-
yond the economic benefits to employees and employers.  But those 
benefits are not likely to be large or to outweigh the recognized pub-
lic interest in competition that weighs against these agreements. 
In the case of arbitration, the FAA has been held to embody a 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”108  To the ex-
tent that policy is based on the perceived ex ante benefits to the par-
ties alone, it adds nothing to our ledger of costs and benefits.  Still, 
arbitration presumably does reduce the burden on courts and on 
judges’ time, the costs of which are borne by the public.  It is unclear 
how much weight we can assign to the public cost of adjudicating 
rights under public law; that is what courts and judges are there for, 
after all.  And that is the price we pay for the public benefits of judi-
cial resolution—published decisions, precedent, and reinforcement of 
public norms.  The contest between the public benefits and the public 
costs of arbitral resolution might seem to be at best a toss-up, but it 
has been officially decided in favor of arbitration (where the parties 
have “agreed” to it).  Even so, it seems that we will not miss much if we 
ignore any external public benefits from these agreements and limit 
ourselves to the claimed benefits to employees and employers. 
108 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (quoting Mit-
subishi  Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)). 
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So the single weighty justification for allowing these agreements is 
that they can serve the legitimate interests of both employees and em-
ployers.  But for the reasons reviewed above, employers will be 
tempted to overreach in both cases, and to overreach in ways that im-
peril inalienable employee rights, important public interests, or both.  
Without fairly strict legal regulation of these agreements, employees 
will not get the benefits that justify allowing these agreements, and 
they will risk losing rights that are supposed to be insulated from con-
tractual waiver.  At least in principle, the hybrid solution of condition-
ally waivable rights provides a vehicle for realizing the mutual benefits 
of these agreements while guarding against their dangers. 
III.  EVALUATING THE LAW OF NON-COMPETE COVENANTS 
 AND MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 
So conditionally waivable rights might provide a better resolution 
than either ordinary contract or mandatory rights to certain problems 
within the employment relationship.  That does not mean, of course, 
that the law as it stands achieves this happy result.  But it does tell us 
something about what the conditions for waiver ought to be, and ul-
timately about when employee rights ought to be conditionally waiv-
able.  The foregoing discussion suggests four criteria by which we can 
evaluate the law governing arbitration and non-compete agreements. 
First, the law—that is, the conditions that the law places on valid-
ity—must protect the nonwaivable employee rights that are at stake in 
these agreements.  If the law cannot reliably protect those inalienable 
employee rights, then the case for allowing these agreements col-
lapses.  Unfortunately, it may often be hard to judge whether em-
ployee rights are secure or not.  At what point does a set of limitations 
on what the employee can do after termination significantly burden 
the right to quit?  At what point do limitations on discovery in arbitra-
tion impinge on the vindication of the underlying substantive rights?  
Yet however difficult it may be to apply this principle, it must be 
paramount. 
Second, the law must protect the public interest at stake in these 
agreements where that interest goes beyond the protection of inalien-
able employee rights.  Distinctly public interests that are external to 
the parties may call for additional conditions that are not necessary 
for the protection of employee rights alone. 
Third, the law should ensure that agreements advance only the le-
gitimate and not the illegitimate aims of employers.  To some degree 
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this replicates the goals of protecting employees’ nonwaivable rights 
and the public interest.  But scrutiny of employer aims may reinforce 
that protection, for some provisions may betray an illegitimate motive 
more clearly than they threaten an impermissible result. 
Fourth, and finally, the law should operate so as to foster self-
policing by employers in drafting these agreements.  It should give 
clear guidance about what is and is not permissible, and it should de-
ter employers from overreaching, not only in the agreements that 
come before courts but in the many more agreements that do not.  
Employers must be discouraged from taking a gamble that they will 
stay below the judicial radar, for agreements that are onerous to em-
ployees may (and may be intended to) deter employees from doing 
what they are entitled to do—quitting and competing, or litigating—
and from thus testing the agreement’s validity. 
An additional objective might be to ensure that these agreements 
do indeed secure benefits to employees as well as to employers ex 
ante.  But that objective might be best pursued indirectly, by ensuring 
that agreements do not impair employees’ inalienable rights or the 
public interest and betray no illegitimate employer objective.  In other 
words, once the parties are confined to agreements that meet the first 
three criteria, we might be entitled to indulge the presumption that 
freedom of contract will produce mutual gains. 
A.  Assessing the Law of Non-Compete Agreements 
The conditions to which non-compete covenants are subject vary 
from state to state, as noted above, and can be roughly arrayed along a 
spectrum from California, which prohibits nearly all postemployment 
restraints on competition, to the “strict scrutiny” states, to the more 
deferential “rule of reason” states.  The foregoing dissection of the 
underpinnings of conditionally waivable rights militates against the 
last and most lax approach.  These agreements are not ordinary con-
tracts because they risk impairing fundamental nonwaivable employee 
rights (as well as public interests).  Most importantly, they risk impair-
ing the employee’s inalienable right to quit her current employment.  
“Strict scrutiny” does a better job of protecting the inalienable right to 
quit, which is potentially imperiled by a non-compete agreement. 
Strict scrutiny need not be fatal in fact, but sometimes it should 
be.  In particular, any agreement that so restricts the employee’s fu-
ture employment options as to effectively bond the employee to the 
current employer should be invalid.  That should be true even if the 
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agreement is necessary to protect employer rights, such as trade secrets.  
Fortunately, it will be rare to encounter an agreement that is both so 
onerous to the employee and yet necessary to the employer (especially 
given the availability of less restrictive means of protecting trade se-
crets).  But the point is worth underscoring:  employer trade secrets 
are not inalienable.  They do not go to the core of personhood and 
self-ownership as does the freedom to quit one’s job, and they might 
have to give way in the rare case of an unavoidable conflict. 
The strict scrutiny approach responds to at least the first three cri-
teria set out above:  it protects inalienable employee rights against in-
direct waiver, it protects the public interest in competition, and it 
guards against employers’ sub rosa pursuit of illegitimate ends.  In 
other words, it does in the arena of non-competes what its constitu-
tional counterpart is meant to do in protecting fundamental rights 
and suspect classes.  Moreover, the non-competes that pass muster 
under strict scrutiny are likely to be those that benefit employees as 
well as employers ex ante:  if a non-compete is genuinely necessary to 
protect an employer’s trade secrets (and does not unduly burden the 
employee’s freedom to quit and work elsewhere), then it presumably 
frees the employer to share valuable secrets with the employee that it 
would not otherwise agree to share (or for which it would otherwise 
exact a high price from the employee to do so). 
The last condition—establishing clear guidance and deterring 
employers from overreaching—requires more attention.  Clear guid-
ance has been notoriously lacking in the law of non-compete cove-
nants.  That is largely because the existence of a legitimate interest 
and the necessity of the restraints imposed by a non-compete are un-
avoidably peculiar to the particular employer, employee, and job at 
issue.  So the law consists of standards that are relatively easy to formu-
late, but difficult to apply predictably in particular cases.109  That has 
made the law of non-competes a source of rampant discontent.  
Tightening up the standards, as recommended here, might seem to 
do little to promote predictability; however, raising the bar for validity 
would reduce the number of arguably valid covenants and potentially 
the number of disputes.  At the extreme, California employers face lit-
tle uncertainty about the validity of non-compete covenants. 
Still, whatever standard would be applied in court, some over-
broad agreements may escape scrutiny by discouraging employees 
109 For elucidation of this point, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562-63 (1992). 
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from quitting and testing their validity.  As suggested above, the prob-
lem of “overreaching under the radar” is exacerbated by courts’ in-
creasing willingness to sever or edit offending provisions rather than 
voiding the whole agreement:  for the employer who seeks to impose 
the widest restrictions possible, why not take a chance and overstep 
the bounds of the law?  If courts instead set a relatively low threshold 
for voiding the agreement—say, an agreement that is substantially 
overbroad under existing law—then employers and their counsel will 
have to play it safe and forego provisions that might be viewed as too 
onerous by a court.  Under this regime, some employees who could be 
subject to a valid non-compete will escape postemployment restraints 
altogether; their freedom to compete is the penalty that deters em-
ployers from imposing overbroad non-competes that purport to pro-
hibit employees from competing in ways they are entitled to do. 
A different sort of penalty would be required to deter the em-
ployer that has no legitimate interest at stake, and is thus not entitled 
to a non-compete covenant at all, from imposing one anyway in hopes 
of evading scrutiny.  Even a manifestly invalid non-compete may have 
in terrorem value against an employee without counsel.  Some employ-
ers insert non-compete covenants as near-boilerplate in employment 
agreements for a wide variety of positions, with little regard to the par-
ticulars of the position or to whether employees are privy to protect-
ible information.  As far as the law is concerned, employers risk noth-
ing with that sort of overreaching (though the market might 
sometimes exact a price), and they might succeed in keeping employ-
ees from leaving and moving to competitors when they are entitled to 
do so.110  The problem of “overreaching under the radar” is common 
to non-competes and arbitration agreements.  A solution proposed in 
the arbitration setting may make sense here as well:  award attorneys’ 
fees against employers whose agreements are thrown out as invalid 
(either on the employer’s motion to enforce or the employee’s mo-
tion to declare it invalid).111
Another indirect check on employer overreaching may be found 
in the law of wrongful discharge, at least for the few employees who 
recognize an overbroad covenant up front:  the law should protect an 
employee who is fired for refusing to sign an overbroad non-
110 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
111 Professor Bales argues that awarding attorneys’ fees to employees who chal-
lenge invalid agreements would “help compensate employees for the costs of litigating 
enforceability, and would modestly discourage employers from imposing lopsided 
agreements.”  Bales, supra note 94, at 47. 
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compete.112  It is hard to fathom why the law would allow the employer 
to fire (or threaten to fire) an employee for refusing to sign an ille-
gally overbroad non-compete agreement.  This use of employment at 
will offends public policy much like the discharge of an employee for 
refusing to violate the law or for filing a workers’ compensation claim.  
Those classic and widely accepted public policy exceptions to em-
ployment at will have cleared a path for enforcing the legal conditions 
on waiver of the right to compete in the rare case of the employee 
who demurs. 
The recommended “strict scrutiny” approach to non-compete 
agreements takes away from employers some contractual tools for pro-
tecting legitimate interests that do not rise to the level of property 
rights.  For those who worry that the economy will suffer if employers 
cannot reliably protect their interest in the valuable knowledge that 
their employees accumulate, it is worth pointing out that Texas and 
California—at least until recently two of the strictest jurisdictions with 
regard to non-competes113—are also home to the two most vibrant 
concentrations of high-tech industry, in which the knowledge inside 
employees’ heads accounts for a very large share of firm value.  Some 
scholars have argued that the very weakness of employers’ property 
and contract rights—limited protection of trade secrets and restric-
tions on non-compete covenants—contributed to those regional suc-
cess stories, in part by fostering employee mobility.114  Indeed, those 
accounts suggest that non-compete covenants not only threaten the 
general public interest in competition but generate a collective action 
problem among firms, at least in some industries and regions.  In 
Ronald Gilson’s words, “[w]hile it would be in the interest of [a] re-
gion’s firms collectively to facilitate employee mobility even at the ex-
pense of diluting the intellectual property of individual firms, it will 
be in the interest of any individual firm to impede the mobility of its 
own employees.”115  A very restrictive legal approach to non-compete 
covenants, as exists in California, may solve that collective action prob-
112 California law does so; other courts have refused to do so.  See supra note 74 
and accompanying text. 
113 See supra note 46. 
114 See Gilson, supra note 34, at 578-79 (contending that California’s prohibition 
on non-compete agreements helps promote growth in Silicon Valley by fostering the 
transfer of knowledge among its technology firms); see also HYDE, supra note 34, at 31-
32 (arguing that Silicon Valley’s growth stems partly from a  “culture of employee mo-
bility” and the related weakness of protection of trade secrets and non-competes). 
115 Gilson, supra note 34, at 596. 
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lem and help facilitate the spillover of employee knowledge and the 
vibrancy of the local economy through mobility. 
Employers faced with tight restrictions on non-competes may seek 
other means of protecting valuable information and relationships.  
Some of those, such as no-solicitation agreements, impose lower costs 
on the employee and the public and run into a less hostile reception 
in the courts.  Employers looking beyond those devices may consider 
borrowing from the British tradition of “garden leave” agreements.116  
In a garden leave agreement, the employee agrees to give notice some 
months prior to departure—say, six months—during which period the 
employer must pay the employee’s salary but may choose not to assign 
any duties, and in any event may prevent the employee from working 
elsewhere.  The employer gets the same protection as a similar period 
of “non-competition,” but must bear the primary economic burden 
itself rather than casting it on the employee.  Employees’ postem-
ployment activities are still restricted; some opportunities may dry up 
and some employee knowledge may grow stale during the period of 
enforced idleness.  But the garden leave device has the virtue of forc-
ing employers to internalize the primary cost of restrictions on em-
ployees’ postemployment activities, and thus to think twice about 
whether and how long they are willing to do so. 
That virtue suggests another way to promote self-policing by em-
ployers:  perhaps an additional condition for the enforcement of a 
non-compete should be the employer’s willingness to continue the 
employee’s salary for the period of enforced idleness—a kind of man-
datory garden leave provision.  Proponents of non-competes may be 
willing to presume that the employee has already earned a premium 
to compensate for the non-compete restrictions; if that is true, that 
premium would presumably be reduced in light of the possible future 
garden leave obligation.  But a garden leave provision would induce 
the employer to reassess the value of the non-compete at the point at 
which it became operative and to bear the primary cost that enforce-
ment imposes on the employee.117
116 For an analysis of “garden leave” provisions and their viability in the United 
States, see Greg T. Lembrich, Note, Garden Leave:  A Possible Solution to the Uncertain En-
forceability of Restrictive Employment Covenants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2291, 2292 (2002). 
117 See Silverstein, supra note 72 at 817 (“I suspect that if employers were required, 
as a condition of enforcing non-compete and non-disclosure agreements, to subsidize 
employees during their non-working time the allure of such covenants, for all but the 
most highly prized employees, would diminish rapidly.”). 
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B.  Assessing the Law of Mandatory Arbitration 
In non-compete covenants, only a few variables are usually in play:  
mainly the nature of the employer’s interest in noncompetition, and 
the scope—temporal, geographic, and occupational—of the ban on 
competition.  Many more variables are in play in mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements, which effectively set out, in more or less detail, an 
alternate forum, decision maker, and set of rules to replace the de-
fault system of courts, judges, and rules of civil procedure.  So it is im-
possible to devise a formula, akin to the “strict scrutiny” standard sug-
gested above, to resolve disputes over the validity of these agreements. 
On the other hand, the law of arbitration may lend itself to 
greater determinacy down the line, for the conditions on enforcement 
of arbitration agreements need not be tailored to particular circum-
stances on a case-by-case basis, as the conditions on enforcement of 
non-competes must be.  All employers are entitled to seek arbitration 
of future employment disputes; no threshold showing of special need 
is required.  Moreover, the conditions on enforceability are largely 
drawn from fixed features of external law and from principles of fair 
adjudication that are independent of the particular parties or dispute.  
So it should be possible to devise a set of rules that makes the en-
forceability of a particular agreement quite predictable ex ante.118  In 
the relatively short period since Gilmer, the law has not yet generated 
those settled rules.  But there is more reason to hope that this will 
happen in the case of arbitration agreements than in the case of non-
compete covenants. 
Given the range of potential controversies, my aim here will be to 
show how the four criteria identified above might help to resolve 
some major issues and perhaps generate some rules along the way.  
While leaving untouched many controversies in the modern law of 
employment arbitration, I hope to show how the foregoing analysis, 
and the underlying analogy to non-compete covenants, might guide 
their resolution. 
The first and most important criterion is that these agreements 
preserve the nonwaivable employee rights that are at stake—in this 
case the employees’ underlying substantive legal rights.  The Supreme 
Court has said that arbitration agreements are valid (as to statutory 
claims) only “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindi-
118 The rules would not resolve all controversies; the broader principles from 
which they were derived would continue to govern novel arbitration provisions. 
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cate [her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”119  That 
condition is most obviously violated by provisions that explicitly bar 
rights or remedies that external law allows.  And indeed, courts have 
invalidated provisions barring punitive damages where they would be 
available in court, requiring each party to bear its own attorneys’ fees 
where the statute awards attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs, and 
capping damages below the level provided by the relevant statute.120  
This can fairly be called a rule:  arbitration agreements may waive or 
take away not substantive rights and remedies but only access to the 
judicial forum (and some of the procedural perquisites of that fo-
rum). 
But the last parenthetical concession exposes the soft underbelly 
of this simple command:  when do procedural provisions—for exam-
ple, limited discovery, time limits, a ban on aggregation of claims—
amount to an impermissible denial or waiver of the substantive rights 
at stake?  And when are they part of the permissible trade-off that ar-
bitration entails and that the Supreme Court has blessed? 
Some procedural provisions may operate to block adjudication.  
Consider, for example, the increasingly prevalent provisions barring 
aggregate claims or class actions either within arbitration or outside of 
it by signatory employees.  For many employers, the perceived ability 
to foreclose class actions is the single greatest advantage to mandatory 
arbitration.121  To be sure, a class action waiver will have little impact 
on many employment claims, especially those based on discharge, ei-
ther because the claims are not suitable for aggregate treatment or 
because they are in any event viable as individual claims.122  But a ban 
119 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
120 See supra note 61. 
121 See Hans Smit, Class Actions in Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 175, 176 
(2003) (“[T]he preference for arbitration may be inspired in part by the perceived 
lack of class actions in arbitration . . . .”); Michael R. Triplett, Class Action Bans in Arbi-
tration Pacts Could Create Limits on Substantive Rights, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 220, at 
A-6, A-7 (Nov. 14, 2003) (quoting a management-side attorney as saying that “the pri-
mary question asked by companies considering arbitration is:  ‘Can we cut off class and 
collective actions by requiring arbitration’”); Peter J. Kreher & Pat D. Robertson III, 
Comment, Substance, Process, and the Future of Class Arbitration, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 
409, 423 (2004) (“Defendants use arbitration agreements, at least in part, to prevent 
class proceedings.”). 
122 “Class action waiver” provisions are thus much more threatening in the con-
sumer context, where individual claims are often very small but very numerous, than in 
the employment context, where enough is often at stake to warrant individual litiga-
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on aggregate actions may doom some otherwise viable claims; that is 
especially likely with claims under the wage and hour laws. 
Consider, for example, a challenge to employer policies that exact 
several minutes per day of work from employees “off the clock” and 
without pay.123  Such policies may deprive hundreds or thousands of 
employees of a fraction of the pay to which they are entitled—perhaps 
$2000 or $3000 per worker over a few years.  That is not a trivial 
amount for the average worker, but it is surely less than the cost of ad-
judication even in a lower-cost arbitral forum.  Each individual thus 
has a “negative value claim” that is very unlikely to be brought.124  But 
the whole class of affected employees may have a perfectly viable ag-
gregate claim.  A class action waiver provision, as applied to such 
claims, would amount to a waiver of the substantive claim itself.125  Let 
us be clear on what this means:  for employees who are bound by a 
class action waiver, an employer has a virtual free pass to engage in 
these illegal practices, and to skim thousands or millions of dollars off 
tion.  In the consumer context, the proliferation of class action waivers threatens to 
vitiate many consumer protection laws.  See Myriam Gilles,  Opting Out of Liability:  The 
Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005).  
For a thoughtful analysis of the substantive implications of class action waivers, see 
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and its Discontents:  Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide 
Arbitration, and CAFA, 107 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 69, on 
file with author). 
123 Such policies have been challenged in lawsuits against Wal-Mart, for example.  
See Steven Greenhouse, Forced To Work off the Clock, Some Fight Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2004, at A1.  Similarly, it has been reported that several retailers, including Wal-Mart, 
have deleted time from employees’ time records, thus cutting many employees’ pay-
checks by small amounts.  See Steven Greenhouse, Altering of Worker Time Cards Spurs 
Growing Number of Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2004, at A1.  For a recent example of a suc-
cessful class action in pursuit of wage claims that were small for each individual but 
large across the employer’s operations, see IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 126 S. Ct. 514 (2005).
124 One might argue that the law’s provision of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” for 
prevailing plaintiffs makes these cases viable.  But courts’ unwillingness to award full 
fees (much less an enhancement in view of the contingent nature of the fee) in such 
“negative value” cases makes attorneys almost uniformly unwilling to take these very 
low-value cases on an individual basis. 
125 California law appears to find a class action waiver “substantively unconscion-
able” as applied to such small but repetitive (consumer) claims, Discover Bank v. Supe-
rior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005), but not the same waiver as applied to 
more substantial individual (employment) claims.  Gentry v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 790, 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).  These decisions draw the right line, but by do-
ing so within the framework of unconscionability, they effectively allow employees to 
waive the right to a fair and viable means of adjudicating nonwaivable claims as long as 
the waiver is not a contract of adhesion.  See infra text accompanying note 130. 
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their employees’ paychecks, with virtually no worries about liability.126  
Where a class action waiver or any other procedural hurdle to adjudi-
cation effectively insulates the employer from liability altogether, it 
simply nullifies employment protections that are enforced primarily 
through private rights of action. 
Indeed, an arbitration agreement’s ban on class or aggregate 
claims arguably suggests an illegitimate purpose on the employer’s 
part.  Because aggregation almost only occurs when it is a more cost-
efficient way to process certain substantive claims—not only more ef-
ficient than individual litigation but usually more efficient than indi-
vidual arbitration as well—a ban on aggregation suggests that the em-
ployer’s aim is not to reduce the cost of the adjudication process but 
to escape some liabilities altogether.  Both the effect of negating some 
nonwaivable employee rights and the apparent purpose of foreclosing 
some meritorious claims altogether condemn class action waiver 
clauses. 
This is not the place for a review of every procedural quirk—short 
filing deadlines, high arbitrator fees, or such—that might operate to 
block employees’ ability to vindicate substantive rights.  But the point 
is to place that precise question—the impact on substantive rights—at 
the center of the inquiry.  The trick is to figure out how to do that 
without resorting to case-by-case assessment of each procedural provi-
sion’s impact on each particular claim.  For the potential mutual gains 
from a more efficient and accessible arbitral forum would be quickly 
consumed by frequent and unpredictable resort to judicial review. 
By that measure, the Supreme Court failed when it provisionally 
resolved the roiling controversy over allocation of arbitrator fees by 
requiring plaintiffs to prove that fees would be “prohibitively expen-
sive.”127  Lower courts have construed that command to require a case-
by-case assessment of the fees in light of the plaintiff’s ability to pay in 
the particular case.128  That is a supremely unhelpful approach to em-
ployers, employees, and lower courts evaluating the lawfulness of any 
126 “Virtually no worries,” as opposed to a complete free pass, because there is a 
remote possibility of public enforcement by the Department of Labor or a state 
agency. 
127 Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000).  Green Tree in-
volved a consumer claim, not an employment claim, but the lower courts have assumed 
that the same standard applies in employment cases, as in Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Ser-
vices, VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 283-84 (3d Cir. 2004). 
128 See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 557-58 (4th 
Cir. 2001). 
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particular fee scheme.  By contrast, a rule that employee (or con-
sumer) plaintiffs cannot be required to pay arbitrator fees in excess of 
the court fees they would have had to pay to litigate would vindicate 
the basic principle—no unreasonable hurdles to adjudication of non-
waivable rights claims—yet be applicable in a predictable and straight-
forward way. 
Another variation on the problem of procedures that affect sub-
stantive rights is the problem of biased decision makers—or, more to 
the point, procedures that permit employers to choose decision mak-
ers that favor them.  Some critics have contended that employers’ “re-
peat player” status gives them a built-in advantage with arbitrators who 
hope for repeat business.129  Efforts to verify the repeat-player advan-
tage empirically have been equivocal at best.130  But employers’ repeat-
player status does induce them to invest in writing favorable agree-
ments (to the extent the law allows them to do so).  Some employers 
have sought to improve their odds by skewing the selection of arbitra-
tors, either by limiting the pool of arbitrators to those likely to favor 
them or by tilting the selection process in their own favor.  The widely 
noted Hooters case in the Fourth Circuit provides an example of such a 
procedure and its inauspicious judicial reception.131
Courts sometimes view the problem of biased arbitration proce-
dures, as well as the problem of barriers to adjudication, through the 
lens of unconscionability.  But the real problem is that binding em-
ployees to a biased arbitral forum effectively amounts to securing a 
waiver of nonwaivable substantive rights.  (It also betrays an illegiti-
mate purpose on the part of the employer to shield itself from liability 
for future conduct.)  It matters a great deal whether a problem like 
this is analyzed through the lens of unconscionability or of “effective 
vindication” of substantive rights.  That is because, in many states, a 
contract is not void unless it is both procedurally unconscionable—
secured under conditions of adhesion by a party with superior bar-
gaining power—and substantively unconscionable—unduly oppressive 
129 See Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration:  Privatizing Public Rights, Compel-
ling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 690 (2004) (“To continue 
their acceptability, arbitrators may, consciously or subconsciously, tend to avoid a re-
cord which employers will view as unfavorable.”). 
130 See generally Bales, supra note 94, at 42-43 (describing studies that have reached 
inconclusive results). 
131 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th  Cir. 1999). 
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or unfair in its terms.132  Provisions that skew the choice of arbitrators 
toward the employer or that create hurdles to adjudication may be 
substantively unconscionable, but under the two-pronged test of un-
conscionability the agreement could nonetheless stand.  It is thus es-
sential that courts ask independently whether the agreement contains 
provisions that threaten the effective vindication of the substantive 
rights at issue; such an agreement amounts to a waiver of nonwaivable 
rights and should be invalid even if the employee voluntarily agreed to 
it. 
That is what the California Supreme Court did in its Armendariz 
decision.  Recognizing that “an arbitration agreement cannot be 
made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of [nonwaivable] statutory 
rights,”133 the court set out five “minimum requirements for [a lawful] 
mandatory employment arbitration agreement”:  (1) neutral arbitra-
tors; (2) more than minimal discovery; (3) a written award; (4) all re-
lief that would be available in court; and (5) no unreasonable costs or 
fees as a condition of access to the arbitral forum.134  Only after find-
ing that those “minimum requirements” were met did the court turn 
to the additional constraints that the “unconscionability” doctrine im-
132 See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
138 (4th ed. 1995) (concluding that unconscionability requires both “an absence of 
meaningful choice” and “contract terms which are unreasonbly favorable to the other 
party”).  The now-prevalent “two-pronged” approach to unconscionability is traced to 
an important scholarly intervention:  Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—
The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).  See George A. Nation III,  Ob-
scene Contracts:  The Doctrine of Unconscionability and Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 
KY. L.J. 101, 110 (2005) (“[A]nalysis of court decisions suggests that a majority of 
courts generally acccept Leff’s framework . . . .”).  But the two prongs are often de-
scribed as creating a “sliding scale”: 
The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive unconscionability] 
must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to 
enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.  But 
they need not be present in the same degree.  Essentially a sliding scale is in-
voked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the con-
tract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness 
or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves.  In other words, the 
more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of proce-
dural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 
unenforceable, and vice versa. 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (cita-
tions and quotation marks omitted); see also Zobrist v. Verizon Wireless, 822 N.E.2d 
531, 541 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (endorsing the sliding scale method of weighting proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability). 
133 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 681. 
134 Id. at 682 (citing Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 
1997)). 
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poses on contracts of all kinds.135  The first step is essential, given the 
primacy of protecting employees’ substantive nonwaivable rights. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, muddied the waters in a pair of deci-
sions that purported to follow Armendariz.  In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams, on remand from the Supreme Court, the court skipped the 
first step and proceeded straight to the question of unconscionabil-
ity.136  Because the agreement was presented as a condition of em-
ployment, it was procedurally unconscionable under Armendariz.  Be-
cause it contained a number of provisions that added up to “a thumb 
on Circuit City’s side of the scale should an employment dispute ever 
arise,” the agreement was substantively unconscionable and invalid.137  
It did not matter in that case that the agreement would also have 
failed the minimum requirements of Armendariz for waiver of the right 
to litigate statutory claims.  But in another Circuit City case a few 
weeks later, the other shoe dropped:  an agreement with the same 
substantively unfair provisions was not void because it was not proce-
durally unconscionable.  Employees had “a meaningful choice not to 
participate in the program;” a “genuine possibility to opt-out of the 
arbitration.”138  The court thus enforced an agreement that effectively, 
albeit more voluntarily, waived the right to a fair adjudication of non-
waivable rights.  That was a mistake. 
The mistake of using unconscionability as the sole framework for 
judging the fairness of arbitration agreements is greatly magnified in 
those jurisdictions that find no procedural unconscionability in 
agreements imposed as a take-it-or-leave-it condition of employ-
ment.139  In those jurisdictions, the unconscionability doctrine appar-
135 I put aside the question whether Armendariz applies the standard unconscion-
ability doctrine or some heightened scrutiny that reflects hostility to arbitration 
agreements (and that would in that case be preempted by the FAA), as some have ar-
gued.  See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 67, at 62. 
136 279 F.3d 889, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2002). 
137 Id. at 892. 
138 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th  Cir. 2002); accord 
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002). 
139 See, e.g., In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 567 (Tex. 2002) (finding no pro-
cedural unconscionability in an arbitration agreement presented as a condition of con-
tinuing employment); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 760-61 (Wash. 
2004) (finding no procedural unconscionability).  The Halliburton court did proceed 
to examine (and approve) the substantive fairness of the agreement in question under 
a less rigid version of unconscionability doctrine than that followed in California.  See 
also Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 301 (5th Cir. 2004) (fol-
lowing Halliburton and upholding arbitration agreements presented as a condition of 
employment); cf. Zobrist v. Verizon Wireless, 822 N.E.2d 531, 540 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
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ently poses no bar to employees being required as a condition of em-
ployment to waive their right to a fair adjudicatory process for future 
statutory claims.  An agreement that impairs the effective vindication 
of nonwaivable statutory rights—whether by limiting remedies, unduly 
constraining access to the forum, or skewing the decision-making 
process—is invalid whether the contract is one of adhesion or one to 
which the employee agreed “voluntarily.”  Recognizing this is the 
linchpin to meeting the first and most important objective set out 
above:  protecting nonwaivable employee rights. 
The second objective is protection of the public interest, specifi-
cally the public’s interest in what we may call the “publicness” of adju-
dication:  accountability, the development of the law through prece-
dent, and the transparency of the adjudicatory process and resulting 
decisions.  That public interest is necessarily compromised by the shift 
from litigation to arbitration, and from publicly selected judges to pri-
vate arbitrators.  That might have been a reason for rejecting manda-
tory arbitration of statutory claims altogether.  But the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gilmer implies that the trade-off of publicness that 
is built into the choice of arbitration is contemplated by the FAA, and 
is permissible even in the core public law arena of antidiscrimination 
law.140  The question remains whether the conditional waivability of 
the judicial forum might allow us to salvage a degree of publicness 
even within the regime of mandatory arbitration.141
A modicum of publicness might be preserved, for example, 
through the issuance and publication of written, reviewable arbitra-
tion awards and by judicial review of awards.  The major arbitration 
organizations have taken the lead in encouraging meaningful written 
(in the consumer context, finding no procedural unconscionability in a “take-it-or-
leave-it” contract). 
140 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
141 In addition to the issue of judicial review discussed here, the public interest 
would have a bearing on confidentiality provisions.  Consider a clause that commits 
the parties and the arbitrator to confidentiality about arbitration proceedings and de-
cisions.  Should employers be able to ensure in advance that whatever they do that is 
illegal or actionable cannot be made public in connection with an employee’s legal 
claim against it?  Or is the employer’s interest trumped by the public’s interest in 
learning about allegations or findings of wrongful conduct by employers, and in the 
development of precedent through published opinions?  This issue arises in connec-
tion with confidentiality agreements in ordinary settlements, but it is more acute in the 
context of a predispute agreement that imposes a vow of silence even before the claim 
is made. 
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awards and their dissemination.142  However, the traditional standard 
for judicial review of arbitration awards has been very narrow.143  
There is a substantial literature debating the virtues of wider judicial 
review of arbitration awards.144  Pushing against a broad standard of 
review is the fact that the cost and delay of routine pre- and post-
arbitration judicial review would defeat the main advantages of arbi-
tration to both employers and employees.  Still, some modicum of 
publicness, and of legal integrity, must be maintained. 
The third objective set out above is to ensure that arbitration 
agreements advance only the legitimate and not the illegitimate aims 
of employers.  The employer’s legitimate aim is to minimize the cost 
of resolving disputes—not the direct costs of liability, but the process 
costs.  By most accounts, those process costs (which include lost work 
time, attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs, and the more intangi-
ble costs of delayed resolution and internal friction) are lower in arbi-
tration than in litigation.145  Some provisions are obviously designed to 
reduce costs and should be struck only if they impede effective vindi-
cation of employees’ substantive rights.  But provisions that might 
handicap plaintiffs and that do not appear to reduce process costs—
e.g., class action waivers—should be highly suspect, for they may be-
tray an illegitimate motive.  Such a provision should trigger close scru-
142 The American Arbitration Association has made employment arbitration 
awards, redacted “to ensure the confidentiality of the parties,” available in a searchable 
online database since 1999.  See Am. Arbitration Assoc., Employment Awards Database, 
http://www.adr.org/AAAawards/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) (cataloging awards filed 
after January 1, 1999). 
143 The FAA provides for vacating an award in cases of corruption or “evident par-
tiality,” or where the arbitrator committed misconduct, exceeded its powers, or failed 
to make an award.  9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000).  To these minimalist grounds for review, 
the Supreme Court has added, for statutory claims, review for “manifest disregard” of 
the law.  Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), rev’d on other grounds, Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  But that standard has 
generally been applied very narrowly and rarely produces a reversal.  See Bales, supra 
note 94, at 44. 
144 A number of commentators advocate continued narrow review of credibility 
and other factual findings but broader review of legal conclusions.  See Bales, supra 
note 94, at 45 (noting Judge Edwards’s proposal to give “broad deference” to findings 
of fact but increased review to conclusions of law); Martin Malin, Privatizing Justice—
But by How Much?  Questions Gilmer Did Not Answer, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 589, 
631 (2001); Dennis R. Nolan, Employment Arbitration After Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 
853, 887-89 (2003); Calvin Sharpe, Integrity Review of Statutory Arbitration Awards, 54 
HASTINGS L. J. 311, 338-42 (2003). 
145 See Bales, supra note 94, at 8-17 (reviewing the empirical literature on litigation 
and arbitration process costs). 
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tiny of the agreement’s overall fairness even if it does not handicap 
the plaintiff in a particular case. 
I have posited, finally, that the law should aim to set clear criteria 
of validity and should operate so as to deter employers from overreach-
ing and imposing provisions that are invalid but that discourage em-
ployees from litigating and testing the agreement’s validity.  On the 
aim for clarity, I recognize that the multiple criteria set out here for 
the validity of arbitration agreements may exacerbate the problem; a 
lax standard may be easier to apply and yield more predictable out-
comes.  Having explained the need for these criteria, I can add little 
but to reiterate the aspiration to derive rules out of these standards, 
wherever possible, to deal with recurring issues. 
On the need to deter overreaching, the problem is parallel to that 
with non-compete covenants:  an invalid agreement can do its dirty 
work without ever getting before a court.  In this case, an unfair arbi-
tration agreement may deter the employee from suing (or deter at-
torneys from suing on her behalf) by putting the employee to a 
choice between arbitrating under the unfair process or challenging it 
in court at significantly added cost.  Some of the solutions suggested 
for non-compete covenants work for arbitration agreements as well.  
First, if employers face the risk that offending provisions will lead a 
court to void the whole agreement rather than merely edit or sever 
the provisions, the employer will have to police itself and avoid over-
reaching, lest it lose the entire benefit that it could have secured 
through a valid agreement.  If the court’s standard response to an in-
valid clause is to sever or “blue pencil” it, the employer has much less 
incentive to police itself.146  Second, as in the non-compete setting, it 
should be unlawful—a wrongful discharge in violation of public pol-
icy—to fire an employee for refusing to sign an invalid arbitration 
146 There is still a potential problem of rogue agreements that plainly cannot meet 
the law’s standards but that might still pay off by deterring litigation and skewing arbi-
tral results without ever seeing a court.  The problem is less acute here than with non-
competes, in that all employers could secure valid arbitration agreements from all em-
ployees and sacrifice their ability to do so by overreaching too badly.  Still, some addi-
tional penalty beyond non-enforcement may be required to deter blatant overreach-
ing.  That might come in the form of attorneys’ fees or allowing an adverse inference 
on the merits of any litigation that is eventually brought that the invalid agreement 
purported to bar.  See id., supra note 94, at 47 (suggesting that courts could “permit 
employees to use the lopsided agreement as evidence supporting punitive damages”). 
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agreement.147  Few employees will have the knowledge and fortitude 
to refuse to sign such an agreement, but those who do refuse should 
not be faced with discharge, and those who are fired should have a 
remedy in tort to discourage employers from thus abusing their power 
under employment at will. 
Another way to promote self-policing by employers would be to 
treat arbitration agreements that are one-sided—that cover employee 
claims but not employer claims, such as those based on appropriation 
of trade secrets or breach of non-compete covenants—as at least sus-
pect.  Call it the “good for the goose, good for the gander” principle.  
Some courts have characterized one-sided agreements as lacking con-
sideration or mutuality.  But the real problem is that when the em-
ployer excludes its own future claims from coverage of an agreement 
that it drafts unilaterally, it has too little incentive to create a fair and 
adequate arbitral process and may be tempted to interpose unreason-
able hurdles to meaningful adjudication (e.g., very short filing dead-
lines or sharply curtailed discovery).  Those flaws might be corrected 
by a reviewing court, but only if the employee challenges the agree-
ment.  By contrast, an agreement that covers employer claims contains 
some built-in incentive for self-policing:  employers who contemplate 
the possibility of arbitrating their own claims against employees or ex-
employees will have an incentive at least to designate a competent tri-
bunal without unreasonable hurdles to adjudication.  Of course they 
will in that case have a greater incentive to skew the decision-making 
process in their own favor if they can; there must be other mecha-
nisms to reach that kind of abuse. 
Agreements that pass muster under all four criteria—in particular 
those under which employees can effectively vindicate their substan-
tive nonwaivable rights and which advance only the legitimate and not 
the illegitimate aims of the employer—should be those that secure 
benefits to employees as well as to employers ex ante.  It is controver-
sial among employee advocates to concede that any predispute arbi-
tration agreement can secure benefits to employees.  But a fair 
agreement that speeds the resolution of disputes at a lower cost—one 
that meets the first three requirements—will allow more employees to 
get a prompt and fair adjudication of their claims.  Evidence that very 
147 The public policy lies both in the underlying legal protections that are threat-
ened by an unfair arbitration agreement and in the public policy of fair adjudication of 
existing rights. 
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few employment cases actually go to arbitration148 is disturbing on this 
score.  Indeed, evidence is mounting that, when cases do go to arbitra-
tion, arbitrators rule for employees more often than courts do 
(though in smaller amounts).  The subset of would-be complainants 
whose claims are strong enough and lucrative enough to attract a law-
yer and to be worth litigating will lose much of the leverage that 
comes from the threat of a public jury trial.  That is a trade-off that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys vigorously resist but that might better serve em-
ployees as a group.149
Indeed, as the law of arbitration has curbed some of the worst 
abuses, and the pool of employment arbitrators has become more 
educated and diverse, some observers have begun to question whether 
arbitration agreements actually produce net gains for employers or 
whether the reduced cost of each case is outweighed by the greater 
number of cases in which employees succeed.150  That equivocation 
should be mildly reassuring about the fairness of the arbitration bar-
gain.  A few years ago, when arbitration agreements were sweeping the 
country and their adoption appeared to be a “no-brainer” for employ-
ers, it was hard to credit claims of the reciprocal advantages of arbitra-
tion for employees.  Now that some employers are questioning 
whether they gain from mandatory arbitration, it is easier to believe 
that employees do gain something.  It also seems less likely that arbi-
tration will completely supplant litigation, public trials, and judicial 
involvement in the development of employment law. 
148 See supra note 106. 
149 Or it might not.  There is a plausible competing story by which employees as a 
group do benefit indirectly from the ability of very few employees to secure a big 
(jury) verdict through litigation.  First, the fear of costly high-profile litigation, and 
potentially a jury trial, is a major impetus to internal reform by employers that benefits 
all employees.  Think, for example, of the antiharassment and antidiscrimination poli-
cies that have transformed employment relations in recent decades.  Second, the rare 
big verdict casts a shadow over the settlement process and may yield larger out-of-court 
settlements for a wide swath of plaintiffs.  Third, the occasional large verdicts and the 
sizable settlements they induce may be crucial to the business model and the success of 
the plaintiffs’ employment bar, which benefits employees.  The leading members of 
the plaintiffs’ employment bar largely succeed by judicious selection and vigorous 
prosecution of the strongest cases and the deftly deployed threat of a jury trial.  The 
virtual elimination of juries and of very large verdicts that juries sometimes award 
might reduce the plaintiffs’ employment bar to something much less dynamic and 
fearsome to employers. 
150 See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using Man-
datory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 405 (2000).
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The right to litigate future employment claims, like the right to 
compete with one’s employer postemployment, is waivable largely be-
cause of the potential mutual benefits of the arbitral forum.  But that 
right is only conditionally waivable primarily because of the impor-
tance of protecting the nonwaivable employee rights that would be at 
risk under the regime of ordinary contract.  Once the reasons for 
conditional waivability are better understood, as I have sought to 
make them here, they give some critical purchase on the law that gov-
erns both mandatory arbitration agreements and non-compete cove-
nants. 
C.  A Closing Word on Conditional Waivability 
Up to now I have used the concept of conditional waivability while 
putting to one side questions about whether the concept aptly cap-
tures the nature and structure of the law governing arbitration 
agreements and non-compete covenants.  By and large, I leave it to 
the reader to judge whether the concept of conditional waivability 
proves useful in recognizing common problems and common solu-
tions in the two areas.  But a few more words may be in order. 
It should now be clear that there are deep congruences between 
the two bodies of law.  In both cases, waivable and nonwaivable em-
ployee entitlements are intertwined somehow, and need sorting out.  
It may be less clear whether “conditional waivability” is the best char-
acterization of this intertwining of entitlements, for one might well 
describe the two bodies of law differently.  The right to compete may 
be seen as a partially waivable right, and the law governing non-
compete covenants may be seen as identifying the line between what is 
waivable and what is not.  The right at stake in arbitration might be 
described as a waivable right to litigate future claims coupled with a 
nonwaivable right to a fair adjudicatory process, the contours of which 
are being worked out through the law of arbitration. 
But the concept of conditional waivability helps to focus attention 
on the conditions that the law imposes on these two discrete and 
rather common sorts of agreements:  what are the conditions of valid-
ity, where do they come from, what are they accomplishing, and what 
happens if they are violated?  The specific answers to those questions 
obviously depend on the differing rights and interests at stake in the 
two cases.  But the shared analytical framework helps to frame a set of 
questions common to the two cases, and encourages us to try out les-
sons learned in one domain to problems in the other. 
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IV.  EXTENDING THE DOMAIN OF CONDITIONALLY WAIVABLE RIGHTS:  
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS 
Let us now switch to a wider-angle lens and ask whether condi-
tional waivability might be of broader use within the law of employ-
ment.  Of course the structure of conditional waivability could be 
adapted to a wide variety of entitlements.  Some entitlements that are 
currently in the general domain of contract—entitlements that em-
ployees have only if the contract so provides, either affirmatively or by 
a default rule—might be shifted to the employee but made condition-
ally waivable.  Some rights that are currently waivable might be forti-
fied by making them conditionally waivable.  Or some employee rights 
that are currently nonwaivable might be made waivable under appro-
priate conditions.  The question is when it might make sense to do so. 
One lesson of the foregoing exercise is that conditional waivability 
tends to be complex and costly to administer—not more costly than 
mandatory rights, perhaps, but certainly more costly than ordinary 
contract terms, which come with a strong presumption of validity.  So 
whether it makes sense to move toward conditional waivability in any 
particular case depends partly on solving that problem:  can condi-
tions be made reasonably clear and predictable, and can the law effec-
tively induce employers to police themselves in the formation of 
agreements?  If not, conditional waivability may make sense only in 
rare circumstances in which the relevant rights and interests are 
aligned much as they are in the case of non-competes and arbitration 
agreements.  If the domain of conditional waivability is defined by a 
convergence of all of the shared features that have been identified in 
those two cases, then it may be very limited.  In particular, the distinc-
tive pairing of rights observed in both cases—one right supplying es-
sential support to an adjacent nonwaivable right—may be rare in ex-
isting law and hard to reproduce even if we relax the constraint of 
existing law. 
On the other hand, if we can solve the problem of cost and com-
plexity, then conditional waivability could prove to be widely useful.  
For the distinctive virtue of conditional waivability is that it allows for 
the pursuit of public values within the flexible framework of private 
contract.  Ordinary contract law is said to afford the parties optimal 
freedom to pursue their own preferences and to reach efficient bar-
gains.  But in the employment context, doubts about the contractual 
paradigm have often won the day when it has run up against cher-
ished public values or goals.  Current law reflects a broad consensus 
that some rights of employees must be fortified against the give-and-
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take—and especially the take—of ordinary contractual bargaining.  
Conditional waivability fortifies employee rights without foreclosing 
mutually beneficial trades.  It allows the parties to bargain within pub-
licly constrained channels toward publicly sanctioned ends in light of 
private and particular needs and interests. 
With that kind of recommendation, the potential domain of con-
ditionally waivable rights may appear vast indeed.  That is particularly 
true in light of growing doubts about the ability of uniform mandates 
and command-and-control regulatory structures to protect employees’ 
interests in the face of boundaryless global competition, organiza-
tional instability, rapidly changing technology, and firms’ incessant 
demands for flexibility.  For some entitlements, a mechanism that al-
lows bargaining within publicly constrained channels under some 
kind of public oversight might be a way to mitigate the inflexibility of 
mandates without giving up on the promotion of public norms.151  
What follows here is merely suggestive. 
Conditionally waivable rights could be created from either end of 
the rights-contract spectrum.  Such rights might be carved out of what 
is now the domain of contract.  One obvious possibility is job security, 
which employees can now secure only by some form of contract—
individual or collective, express or implied, negotiated bilaterally or 
conferred unilaterally by official policy.  That is in striking contrast to 
mandatory unjust dismissal protections that exist in nearly all other 
advanced economies.  Commentators have proposed switching to a 
default principle of “good cause” dismissal to reflect widespread em-
ployee beliefs and bargaining impediments;152 but most employers are 
already a step ahead, having reasserted their power to discharge at will 
through express disclaimer clauses.  One might construct instead a le-
gal right to job security that can be waived under specified condi-
tions.153  For example, a waiver of job security might be upheld where 
it came with some combination of severance pay and relocation and 
retraining benefits.154  The idea would be to impose conditions that 
151 The potential use of conditionally waivable rights as one building block of a 
post-command-and-control employment law is an extension of themes I have explored 
elsewhere and plan to develop in future work.  See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law 
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 333 (2005). 
152 See Issacharoff, supra note 7, at 1794; Sunstein, supra note 25, at 120. 
153 I explored this possibility briefly in another article.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, How 
Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 23-27 
(2002). 
154 The standard economic argument would hold that increasing the cost of ter-
minations, whether through mandated job security or the proposed alternative pack-
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gave employees some of the economic security and employability that 
job security does (or did in the halcyon days of “lifetime employ-
ment”), while affording more flexibility to employers who need it and 
are willing to pay for it.155
Other employment benefits that are currently available only by 
contract might be made into conditionally waivable employee enti-
tlements.  Employees might, for example, be granted a statutory right 
to health benefits that is waivable under conditions that ensure that 
the employee has adequate alternative coverage, public or private.156  
A conditionally waivable employee right to health care coverage may 
be a distant second-best alternative to a universal health care guaran-
tee, but it might also be a more politically viable step in that direction. 
Conditional waivability could also be imposed on rights that are 
otherwise freely waivable (or are subject to “knowing and voluntary” 
but otherwise unconstrained waiver).  That is essentially what Con-
gress did to claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) in enacting the Older Workers’ Benefits Protection Act 
(OWBPA).  A valid waiver of an existing ADEA claim must be “in ex-
change for consideration in addition to anything of value to which the 
[employee] already is entitled,” such as normal severance pay, and it 
must be preceded by disclosure of information about the triggering 
event and sufficient time to consult with an attorney.157  Existing legal 
claims, unlike future claims, are inevitably settleable, and almost nec-
essarily waivable.  But the OWBPA seeks to ensure that employees 
have some idea of what they might be giving up and that they get 
something in exchange.158  The OWBPA might serve as a useful legal 
age of protections, is unlikely to be absorbed by employers and will be paid for by 
workers in the form of either reduced wages or reduced employment.  I offer no re-
sponse here except to suggest that what we have now—employment at will coupled 
with numerous exceptions—is itself quite costly to administer.  See Estlund, supra note 
14, at 1675. 
155 One might achieve economically similar results by imposing mandatory good 
cause if it took the form of a liability right (a right to limited damages but not to rein-
statement), or if it were coupled with a willingness to enforce contractual liquidated 
damages provisions.  The advantage of a conditionally waivable right, if any, would lie 
in the ability to customize the conditions—for example, by the provision of employ-
ability benefits—beyond what standard remedial options permit. 
156 There is an analogous logic to some state “pay-or-play” laws, which require cov-
ered employers either to offer health coverage to their employees at a reasonable rate 
or to pay into a public fund that provides a default system of health insurance. 
157 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(H) (2000). 
158 The unspecified requirement of additional consideration is the only substan-
tive condition on OWBPA waivers; the other conditions are basically procedural.  As 
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template for regulating the waiver of other existing employment 
claims.  Indeed, in practice, the OWBPA is serving as a broader tem-
plate:  because ADEA claims may be included in the single broad 
waiver that employers often seek from employees at the time of sever-
ance, employers are well advised to, and often do, follow the relatively 
stringent statutory standards of the OWBPA.159
Finally, some employee rights that are currently nonwaivable 
might be made waivable under appropriate conditions.  The key 
would be to identify nonwaivable rights that are not essential to per-
sonhood and citizenship in a free society, that need not be universal 
to vindicate the underlying public objectives, and that might be un-
duly rigid given the diversity of organizations and the changing condi-
tions they face.  I will not venture here to fill out these broad outlines 
with more than a few examples. 
An example might be the right to the overtime premium (time-
and-a-half) under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for hours in 
excess of forty per week.  Some employees—especially those with fam-
ily responsibilities—might prefer compensatory time off instead.  
Conditional waivability might be a way of satisfying those preferences 
without simply dumping overtime rights into the free-for-all of the 
market.  Waiver of the overtime premium might be conditioned, for 
example, on “comp time” accruing at the same time-and-a-half rate, 
and on some assurance of its being available to meet employee and 
not just employer needs.160  In fact, the FLSA allows precisely this 
trade-off for some employees:  public employers are permitted to give 
compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay pursuant to an individ-
ual or collectively bargained agreement.161  So while most private sec-
tor employees have a nonwaivable statutory right to overtime pay, pub-
lic employees have a conditionally waivable right—a bargaining chip 
such, the OWBPA requirements only barely represent a form of conditional waivability 
as I have defined it. 
159 Jonathan D. Glater, For Last Paycheck, More Workers Cede Their Rights To Sue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2001, at A1. 
160 This would be an example of converting a nonwaivable right into a condition-
ally waivable right, but it might also be a mechanism for creating a conditionally waiv-
able right out of what now lies in the domain of contract.  Salaried professional and 
managerial employees who fall within the FLSA’s “white collar exemptions” currently 
have no right to the overtime premium.  Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.  
§ 213(a)(1) (2000).  Allowing the conditional waiver of overtime rights in favor of 
“comp time” might pave the way for extending overtime rights to some groups of em-
ployees who are currently exempt. 
161 29 U.S.C. § 207(o) (2000). 
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that they can trade for a publicly approved substitute benefit (comp 
time) that they may value more. 
Many employee rights are nonwaivable for sound reasons; some 
are essential to human freedom and equal citizenship.  The core of 
antidiscrimination law is a prime candidate for continued nonwaiv-
ability.  But it is important to note that, at the margins, antidiscrimina-
tion law has begun to permit the trade-off of some elements of liability 
in exchange for internal avenues of relief (albeit not through the 
mechanism of contractual waiver, but through judicially crafted stan-
dards of liability and affirmative defenses).  For example, employers 
can escape liability for some harassment claims if they take reasonable 
steps to prevent and redress harassment.162  Employers can escape pu-
nitive damages under Title VII if they demonstrate “good faith efforts 
to comply” with the law through internal procedures.163
These developments are controversial.164  But they do show that 
trade-offs of the sort that conditional waivability might permit are not 
unthinkable even within the domain of antidiscrimination law.  They 
also suggest a particular sort of trade-off—some elements of external 
liability in exchange for internal rights, remedies, and procedures—
that may further extend the usefulness of conditional waivability.  
Many of the rights that external law confers on employees deliver far 
less to employees than they cost employers, given the unwieldiness 
and burdens of regulation and litigation.  It may therefore be worth 
thinking of some employee rights as potential leverage for the promo-
tion of better forms of workplace governance in which employees 
have a real voice.  It is worth thinking about, but it is not worth doing 
unless the conditions and the mechanism for enforcement are at least 
as effective in protecting public goods and employee interests, and no 
more costly than the existing rights-enforcement regime.  If that chal-
lenge can be met, some of the myriad employee rights might be made 
162 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998) (recogniz-
ing an affirmative defense to harassment liability if no “tangible employment action” is 
taken, if the employer has exercised “reasonable care” to prevent harassment, and if 
the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s procedures). 
163 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 544 (1999). 
164 See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 
106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 1632-34 (2001) (arguing that judicial approval of and deference 
to corporate antidiscrimination and diversity programs have transformed legal rights 
to be more congenial to managerial values); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance 
and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 492 (2003) (contending 
that a liability regime focused on compliance with internal procedures may lead to un-
derenforcement). 
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partially and conditionally waivable to the end of promoting more 
democratic workplace governance mechanisms that serve employees 
better than the rights-litigation paradigm that has loomed so large in 
the law of employment. 
In considering the extension of conditionally waivable rights to 
new areas, it is worth recalling the several criteria proposed above for 
the valid waiver of the right to compete and the right to litigate, for 
those same conditions might provide useful guidance in crafting new 
conditionally waivable rights.  Above all, the law should protect any 
nonwaivable employee rights that are at stake in these agreements.  
Having now relaxed the fixed constraint of existing law on what is 
nonwaivable, I have introduced both more flexibility and greater risk 
into the equation.  Before making any nonwaivable rights condition-
ally waivable, or even partially so, we should consider carefully 
whether some core of the right should remain nonwaivable and 
shielded from effective waiver.  I do not claim to have set out the 
normative criteria that should guide this inquiry; I have only shown 
why the inquiry is a crucial one.165
A major challenge in crafting any new conditionally waivable 
rights will be making them reasonably administrable.  We have seen 
that the structure of conditional waivability may tend to promote 
complexity and indeterminacy:  the contractual form affords flexibil-
ity and invites both experimentation and opportunism; the legal con-
ditions on validity allow for the promotion of public norms, but also 
require effective oversight.  Greater awareness of these built-in diffi-
culties, to which I hope to have contributed here, may allow policy- 
and lawmakers to craft conditionally waivable rights that avoid those 
difficulties and that secure benefits to employees as well as to employ-
ers. 
CONCLUSION 
Conditionally waivable rights in the employment setting present 
some characteristic challenges and puzzles, but also some distinctive 
virtues.  A better understanding of this hybrid form provides a useful 
critical vantage point from which to assess the two primary examples 
165 In addition, the substance and the form of conditional waivability should pro-
tect whatever public interest is at stake in these agreements beyond the enforcement of 
employee rights; it should aim to ensure that the agreements advance only the legiti-
mate and not the illegitimate aims of employers—“illegitimacy” being defined by ref-
erence to whatever inalienable employee rights or public interests are at risk. 
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of conditionally waivable rights in existing employment law, and may 
point toward improvements in the law governing both non-compete 
covenants and mandatory arbitration agreements.  A better under-
standing of conditional waivability may also point to a middle path be-
tween the more familiar forms of employment law, bringing flexibility 
to the realization of employee rights and public values to the em-
ployment contract. 
On the other hand, conditionally waivable rights are at best only a 
small part of the solution to the simmering crisis of labor and em-
ployment law in an increasingly globalized economic environment.  
The crisis lies in the enfeeblement of familiar tools for the social con-
trol of labor market dynamics and outcomes.  The domain of collec-
tive bargaining has shrunk to well under one-tenth of the private sec-
tor workforce.  Command-and-control regulatory schemes have come 
under attack from all sides, both for their rigidity and for their lax en-
forcement and their loose grip on footloose firms.  The vindication of 
rights through litigation has proven both ineffectual for many em-
ployees and burdensome to employers, and is being transformed and 
potentially weakened by the move toward arbitration.  New tools are 
required to meet the needs of an increasingly diverse and mobile 
workforce in an increasingly global, competitive, and fast-changing 
market for goods and services, and in the increasingly volatile organi-
zations that compete in that market.  The intriguing promise of con-
ditional waivability lies in its potential for enabling social control and 
promoting public norms while reckoning with organizations’ need for 
flexibility. 
 
